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THE POWER TO EXCLUDE AND THE POWER TO
EXPEL
DONALD J. SMYTHE*
ABSTRACT
Property laws have far-reaching implications for the way people live and for the
opportunities they and their children will have. They also have important
consequences for property developers and businesses, both large and small. It is not
surprising, therefore, that modern developments in property law have been so strongly
influenced by political pressures. Unfortunately, those with the most economic
resources and political power have had the most telling influences on the development
of property laws in the United States during the twentieth century. This Article
introduces a simple game—the “Not-In-My-Backyard Game”—to illustrate the
motivations of various parties with interests in the direction of American property law.
As the analysis indicates, affluent residents and owners of upscale businesses have
incentives to pressure suburban governments for zoning regulations that effectively
exclude less affluent residents from their neighborhoods. Affluent residents and
corporations who want to relocate into urban neighborhoods have incentives to
pressure city governments to use eminent domain to facilitate urban redevelopment
projects, and the takings that ensue often effectively expel many less affluent residents
and smaller businesses from their neighborhoods. The analysis accords with the
historical evidence. In the early twentieth century, suburban governments began to use
zoning ordinances to exclude poor and less affluent residents from suburban
neighborhoods. Around the middle of the twentieth century, city governments began
to use takings to effectively expel less affluent residents and smaller businesses from
urban neighborhoods. The United States Supreme Court upheld the powers of local
governments to exclude and expel, and state courts acquiesced to them. The
consequences are high and rising land prices, unaffordable housing, homelessness,
and the perpetuation of the de facto segregation of the American people by income,
wealth, race, ethnicity, religion, and national origin.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Property laws have far-reaching implications for the way people live and for the
opportunities that they and their children will have. They also have important
consequences for property developers and businesses, both large and small. It is not
surprising, therefore, that developments in property law have been so strongly
influenced by political pressures. Unfortunately, those with the most economic
resources and political power have had the most telling influences on the way property
laws developed in the United States during the twentieth century. Thus, modern
American property law strongly favors the interests and aspirations of those with the
most economic and political power and disfavors poor and marginalized groups. 1
This Article uses a simple normal form game—the “Not-In-My-Backyard
Game”—to illustrate the motivations of various parties with interests in the direction
of American property law. Affluent and wealthy people who want to escape the grime
and blight of urban neighborhoods by relocating to the suburbs, as well as the upscale
businesses that supply and serve them, have incentives to pressure suburban
governments to enact zoning regulations that effectively exclude less affluent and less
wealthy residents from their suburban neighborhoods. Affluent and wealthy people
who want to enjoy an urban lifestyle, as well as many large corporations, may be
reluctant to relocate into urban areas unless city governments redevelop entire
neighborhoods to offer them the amenities of an upscale, urban environment. This puts
pressures on city governments to use takings to facilitate urban redevelopment,2 and
the takings often will effectively expel many less affluent residents and smaller
businesses from these urban neighborhoods. 3
In response to political pressures, local governments initially began using zoning
ordinances to exclude poor and less affluent people from suburban neighborhoods in
the early twentieth century.4 Sometime around the middle of the twentieth century, as
pressure to gentrify urban neighborhoods mounted, local governments also began
using takings to implement urban economic redevelopment plans, which often

1

Harold A. McDougall, Gentrification: The Class Conflict over Urban Space Moves into
the Courts, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 177, 177 (1981).
2

Id. at 178.

3

Id.

4

Bethany Y. Li, Now Is the Time!: Challenging Resegregation and Displacement in the
Age of Hypergentrification, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1189, 1211 (2016).
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effectively expelled poor and less affluent people from urban neighborhoods. 5 The
legal and constitutional powers of local governments to enact zoning schemes and
implement economic development takings were soon challenged. The United States
Supreme Court has upheld those powers in sweeping and categorical terms 6 and thus,
perhaps unintentionally, upheld the power of local government to exclude and expel.
For the most part, state courts have also acquiesced to these powers.7 Unfortunately,
under political pressures from affluent groups and corporate interests, local
governments have continued to use their powers to enact zoning schemes that exclude
poor and middle-class people from suburban neighborhoods8 and to implement urban
redevelopment plans that displace poor and marginalized urban residents from urban
neighborhoods.9 This has contributed to rising land prices,10 the unaffordability of
housing,11 homelessness,12 and the perpetuation of the de facto segregation of
individuals by income, wealth, race, ethnicity, religion, and national origin. 13
Section II of this Article uses property theory to offer a legal analysis of the
expansion in the scope of governmental zoning and takings powers. Section III
presents the Not-In-My-Backyard Game and uses it both to illustrate the motivations
of the various parties involved in urban redevelopment and explain how and why
affluent homeowners and corporate interests have had inordinate political influence
over the direction of American property law. Section IV describes and analyzes the
way in which the government’s power to exclude developed, and Section V describes
and analyzes the way in which the government’s power to expel developed. Section
VI offers conclusions and a ray of hope for the prospect of fundamental reforms on
the horizon.
II. A PROPERTY RIGHTS ANALYSIS
A. The Bundle of Sticks Analogy
The place to start any property analysis is with the theory of property rights. For
the sake of the analysis, consider a fee simple in land to be the representative property
interest.14 The prevalent modern theory of property rights analogizes them to a “bundle
5

McDougall, supra note 1, at 178.

6

Eric R. Claeys, Euclid Lives? The Uneasy Legacy of Progressivism in Zoning, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 731, 731 (2004) [hereinafter Claeys, Euclid Lives?].
7

Id. at 740–41.

8

Adam P. Hellegers, Eminent Domain as an Economic Development Tool: A Proposal to
Reform HUD Displacement Policy, 3 MICH. ST. U. DETROIT C. L. L. REV. 901, 943 (2001).
9

Li, supra note 4, at 1211.

10

Id. at 1208.

11

Id.

12

Id.

13

Id. at 1210.

14

For a classic treatment of estates in land, see POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY: MICHAEL
ALLEN WOLF DESK EDITION (Michael Allen Wolf ed., LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2009), and
SHELDON F. KURTZ & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CASES AND MATERIALS ON AMERICAN PROPERTY
LAW 246 (4th ed. 2003).
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of sticks.”15 Thus, property rights consist of the legal rights and obligations of persons
in regard to land or chattels.16 We can think, therefore, of the property rights associated
with a fee simple in land as a bundle of rights and obligations, in which the rights
include the uses that may be made of the land,17 the actions that can be taken on or
with the land,18 and the transactions that can be undertaken to convey rights and
obligations in the land,19 and in which the obligations include the duty to pay taxes on
the land,20 any other affirmative duties under public laws or regulations on the land,21
and the duties associated with any affirmative private land use servitudes.22 Public
laws or regulations and private land use servitudes restricting land uses would
typically eliminate or diminish specific rights in the bundle of sticks,23 whereas public
laws or regulations and private land use servitudes that impose affirmative duties on
the owner would add obligations to the bundle of rights or augment existing ones. 24
An unregulated, unrestricted, and untaxed parcel of land would be a fee simple in the
most absolute sense possible.25
B. Zoning Regulations
The bundle of sticks analogy can help clarify how government regulations,
especially zoning regulations, affect private property rights. A regulation that restricts
land uses eliminates certain rights in the owner’s bundle, and a regulation that imposes
affirmative duties on the landowner adds certain obligations. The mere fact that the
government has the regulatory authority to eliminate certain rights in an owner’s
bundle implies that the government has something similar to a right of entry26 against
15

See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 102–03 (2014).

16

To be more precise, a well-defined system of property law defines the hierarchy of
persons’ rights regarding land or chattels. Id. at 33–34.
17 Jane B. Baron, Rescuing the Bundle-of-Rights Metaphor in Property Law, 82 U. CIN. L.
REV. 57, 68 (2014).
18

OHIO STATE BAR ASS’N, THE LAW & YOU 111 (14th ed. 2012) (1967),
https://www.ohiobar.org/General%20Resources/LawandYou/TLAY_Complete.pdf.
19

Id.

20

Id.

21

Id.

22

Id.

23

Eric R. Claeys, Bundle-of-Sticks Notions in Legal and Economic Scholarship, 8 ECON. J.
WATCH 205, 211–14 (2011).
24 Robert C. Ellickson, The Affirmative Duties of Property Owners: An Essay for Tom
Merrill, 3 PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 43, 48–49 (2014).
25
Roger W. Andersen, Present and Future Interests: A Graphic Explanation, 19 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 101, 103–05 (1995).
26

Under the common law—still followed in most states—a grantor who owns an estate in
land can convey the estate to a grantee subject to the grantor’s “right to enter” and take the estate
back from the grantee. The government’s power to regulate a privately-owned estate in land
gives the government something analogous to a “right to enter” and eliminates certain rights in
the owner’s bundle.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol66/iss2/7

4

2018]

THE POWER TO EXCLUDE

371

those property rights even if the government never exercises its regulatory authority.
If the constitutional scope of the government’s regulatory powers is broadened, that
augments the scope of the government’s right to enter, thereby immediately
diminishing the scope of private property rights. 27 The implication is that, as the
Supreme Court narrowed the doctrine of substantive due process and expanded the
scope of the government’s regulatory powers during the twentieth century,28 the Court
narrowed the scope of private property rights, even when the government did not
immediately exercise its new powers.
Of course, private property rights did not disappear as soon as the Supreme Court
affirmed local governments’ zoning powers, but private property did become subject
to increased risks of being curtailed by governmental regulations. 29 And the effect was
immediate. As soon as the scope of the government’s regulatory power increased, all
private property rights became subject to broader and, in a sense, larger “governmentowned” contingent future interests.30 Property rights thus became more encumbered
by local governments’ de facto right to enter and eliminate sticks from owners’
bundles.31 Moreover, when governments exercise their zoning powers, the regulations
take “sticks” from the owners’ bundles or add obligations that make their ownership
more burdensome. From a historical perspective, when the United States Supreme
Court upheld the government’s right to enact zoning laws in Village of Euclid,32 that
immediately affirmed local governments’ power to eliminate particular private
property rights in land.33 When local governments used their powers to enact zoning
ordinances, they, in fact, eliminated particular private property rights in land.34 The
important question is: who controls the government’s power to regulate private
property?
C. Takings
We could ask the same question about the government’s takings power. In fact,
the United State Supreme Court also expanded the government’s takings power during
27

Daniel B. Klein & John Robinson, Property: A Bundle of Rights? Prologue to the
Property Symposium, 8 ECON. J. WATCH 193, 195 (2011).
28 The substantive due process doctrine defines the scope of the government’s inherent
powers. The United States Supreme Court applied the doctrine strictly in the early decades of
the twentieth century and thus struck several governmental regulations in a number of important
cases. BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT 3 (1998). The matter nearly
resulted in a constitutional crisis when President Roosevelt was impeded from implementing
his New Deal legislation. Id. The Court then began to apply the substantive due process doctrine
less strictly before President Roosevelt followed through on his “Court packing plan.” Id. The
scope of the government’s regulatory powers was defined more broadly thereafter and private
property rights were circumscribed more severely. Id.; see generally G. EDWARD WHITE, THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL (2000).
29

See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 383 (1926).

30

Id.

31

Id.

32

See infra Part IV.

33

Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 383.

34

See infra Part IV.
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the twentieth century.35 For practical purposes, a conventional or physical taking
terminates the entire bundle of rights and obligations that a person owns in land or
chattels.36 A regulatory taking arises when regulations would eliminate so many or
such important rights from the bundle of sticks or add so many obligations that the
courts determine the regulations amount to a taking.37 The property owners would then
receive just compensation, but that compensation typically would be calculated to
reflect the fair market value of the rights eliminated, the obligations added, or both. 38
A taking through exactions39 is the most complicated case. In that case, courts would
have to determine that the exactions demanded in return for a permit required under a
set of regulations had neither the requisite connection to the purpose of the regulations
or the proportionality to the adverse impact of the owner’s proposed use to pass
constitutional muster.40 This determination would boil down to the courts deciding the
regulators were demanding to eliminate so many rights or to place so many obligations
in the bundle of sticks, or both, that the exactions amounted to a taking. 41 The court
would then require that the party receive just compensation, calculated again with
reference to the fair market values of the rights eliminated and the obligations placed
in the bundle.42
The government does not actually violate anyone’s property rights when it uses
eminent domain to take private property. Given a well-defined corpus of takings law,
when someone acquires property in land or chattels, they receive the property rights
and obligations subject to the possibility that the government may be able to exercise
the power of eminent domain to take some or all of the rights, to add additional
obligations to their bundle of sticks, or both.43 For practical purposes, the fact that
private property can be subject to takings means that the government has a contingent
future interest44 in all private property (at least all private property within the reach of
its takings powers). To again draw an analogy with future interests, it is as if the
35

See infra Part V.

36 “In a physical taking, the government, or some private party authorized by the
government, occupies private land in whole or in part.” Richard A. Epstein, Physical and
Regulatory Takings: One Distinction Too Many, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 99, 101 (2012).
37

Id.

38

Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for Regulatory
Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 677, 678 (2005). There are many nuisances. See id. at 682–703
(discussing types of nuisances).
39

Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and the
Consequences of Clarity, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 609, 611 (2004).
40

Id.

41

This is an intuitive way of describing the nexus and rough proportionality tests for
exactions under the Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Hard
Bargain and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 IOWA L.J. 1, 3 (2000).
42

The courts typically apply the fair market value standard, even though it raises myriad
conceptual and practical problems. See, e.g., Katrina Miriam Wyman, The Measure of Just
Compensation, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 239, 252 (2007).
43

Donald J. Smythe, Liberty at the Borders of Private Law, 49 AKRON L. REV. 1, 26 (2015).

44

See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35 (1954).
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government retained a right of entry (or power of termination) when it initially granted
property interests in land.45 The only significant difference between a governmental
taking and a grantor’s exercise of a right of entry is that when a private grantor
exercises a right of entry against her grantee, she typically has no obligation to provide
the grantee with any compensation;46 however, when the government exercises
eminent domain by taking private property, the private property owner is entitled to
just compensation.47
Nonetheless, when the United States Supreme Court issues an opinion that
expands the scope of the government’s takings powers, the holding immediately
subjects all private property to increased risks that the government will exercise its
takings powers.48 Such an opinion augments the government’s contingent future
interest in all private property and thus diminishes individuals’ private property
rights.49 Therefore, in a sense, the Supreme Court expands the government’s
contingent rights against private property as soon as it broadens the scope of the
government’s takings powers. This itself could be considered a kind of expropriation
even though it is not a taking and just compensation is not required.50 Of course, if the
government exercised its expanded takings powers, obviously a further and more
significant expropriation would occur.51 But merely increasing the scope of the
government’s takings powers immediately infringes on private property rights. 52 The
matter is far from merely academic because in the second half of the twentieth century,
the Supreme Court significantly expanded the government’s takings powers, 53 and
local governments across the country began using their broadened powers to pursue
political objectives, which often included redeveloping urban neighborhoods. 54
D. The Levers of Government
Because an expansion in the government’s regulatory and takings powers has such
important implications, the obvious question is: who controls those powers? Of
course, as a kind of public property, the government’s powers to regulate and take
private property are subject to political control.55 The vagaries of the political process
inevitably mean that this adds considerable uncertainty to the scope of an individual’s
private property rights. Because people are generally risk averse, other things equal,

45

Smythe, supra note 43, at 26.

46

Wyman, supra note 42, at 249.

47

Id. at 252–53.

48

Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 517, 536 (2009).

49

Id. at 562.

50

See Wyman, supra note 42, at 239.

51

See Bell, supra note 48, at 518–20.

52

Id.

53

See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35 (1954).

54

See infra Part V.

55

Bell, supra note 48, at 520–21 (footnotes omitted).
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the uncertainty would tend to decrease the value of private property to its owners. 56
But in this case, other things are not equal because political power and influence are
not equal, and the political process has inherent biases and tendencies that likely more
than offset the adverse impacts of the uncertainty on the market value of private
property.57 In fact, the way the political process works, the effect of politicizing private
property by augmenting the government’s regulatory and takings powers is almost
certainly to put ongoing, upward pressure on the market value of private property
rights.58 The intuition is quite simple: those with the greatest vested interests dominate
the local political processes that control zoning and governmental takings. 59 In
addition, the people with the greatest vested interests are the ones who own and control
the most private property.60 The incentives of wealthy and influential property owners
inevitably incline them to use their political influence to ensure that government
regulations and takings drive private property values up rather than down and thus
increase rather than decrease their wealth.

56

This is an established principle of economics. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN GOLLIER, THE
ECONOMICS OF RISK AND TIME 20–21 (2001) (discussing the risk premium that a rational person
would pay to eliminate a risk); see also Dennis R. Capozza & Gregory M. Schwann, The Value
of Risk in Real Estate Markets, 3 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 117, 117–18 (1990) [hereinafter
Capozza & Schwann, The Value of Risks].
57 Not surprisingly, studies have found the effect of regulatory risks on real estate prices
quite complicated. See, e.g., Dennis R. Capozza & Gregory M. Schwann, The Asset Approach
to Pricing Urban Land: Empirical Evidence, 17 AM. REAL EST. & URB. ECON. ASS’N J. 161,
161 (1989); Capozza & Schwann, The Value of Risks, supra note 56, at 117–18; Karsten Lieser,
Pricing of Specific Real Estate Market Risks for 66 Countries Worldwide 1–3 (IESE Bus. Sch.
Univ. of Navarra, Working Paper No. 940, 2011), http://www.iese.edu/research/pdfs/di-0940e.pdf. The effects of regulatory risks are especially complicated because some regulations might
actually reduce other risks and increase land values overall. This phenomenon is consistent with
the thesis presented in this Article.
58 There is substantial empirical evidence showing that zoning laws and urban
redevelopment have increased land values and housing prices. For studies that examine the
effects of zoning, see Edward L. Gleaser et al., Why Have Housing Prices Gone Up?, 95 AM.
ECON. REV. 329 (2005); John M. Quigley & Larry A. Rosenthal, The Effects of Land Use
Regulation on the Price of Housing: What Do We Know? What Can We Learn?, 8 CITYSCAPE:
J. POL’Y DEV. & RES. 1, 69 (2005); Edward L. Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Impact of Zoning
on Housing Affordability 1–35 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8835,
2002). The effects of the government’s takings powers are more complicated to evaluate
because they have been intertwined with urban renewal and redevelopment programs. For
evidential support, see William J. Collins & Katharine L. Shester, Slum Clearance and Urban
Renewal in the United States, 5 AM. ECON. J. APPLIED ECON. 239 (2013); Veronica Guerrieri et
al., Endogenous Gentrification and Housing Price Dynamics 1–55 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 16237, 2010).
59

See McDougall, supra note 1, at 177.

60

The groups may vary depending on the neighborhood and context, but they typically
include homeowners, businesses, bankers, real estate speculators, and property developers. For
a variety of viewpoints that largely agree about the important actors, see TODD DONOVAN ET
AL., STATE & LOCAL POLITICS 378 (Carolyn Merrill ed., 2009); WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, ZONING
RULES!: THE ECONOMICS OF LAND USE REGULATIONS ix (2015); RUTHERFORD H. PLATT, LAND
USE AND SOCIETY 200 (3d ed. 2014).
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III. THE NOT-IN-MY-BACKYARD GAME
A. A Worm’s Eye View
The basic problem can be clarified with a simple normal form game. 61 A normal
form game is described by the players, their strategic options, and the payoffs that
each of them would earn under all the possible combinations of their actual decisions.62
Games can be described more completely in extensive form, 63 but normal form games
often provide a convenient way of explaining and remembering a general kind of
strategic problem.64 To that end, normal form games often seem to caricature the
players by boiling their alternatives down to their essential strategic elements. 65
Although that is certainly true of the Not-In-My-Backyard Game, there is nothing
funny about it; in fact, the game represents an unfortunate but important problem and
suggests less than flattering ulterior motivations for the way many people have
influenced the development of modern property laws. 66
Assume there are two players: for convenience, call them “Rich” and “Poor.” Rich
can be thought of more generally as an upper-middle or middle-class person or family,
and Poor can be thought of more generally as a working-class or poor person or family.
Assume each of the two players has two strategic options: “Urban” or “Suburban.”
Urban is a decision to live in the downtown core of the city; Suburban is a decision to
live on the outskirts of the city in a suburban neighborhood. Assume that if Rich and
Poor both choose to live in the same area, whether Urban or Suburban, Rich will earn
a “High” payoff and Poor will earn a “Low” payoff. 67 Assume, however, that if Rich
and Poor choose to live in different areas of the city, regardless of whether Rich
chooses Urban and Poor chooses Suburban or whether Rich chooses Suburban and
Poor chooses Urban, Rich will earn a “Very High” payoff and Poor will earn a “Very
Low” payoff. The entire normal form game can be depicted as follows:68
61
For a nontechnical introduction to game theory, its history, and its methods, see MORTON
D. DAVIS, GAME THEORY (1997); WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER’S DILEMMA (1992). For
introductions to game theory written specifically for legal professionals, see HOWELL E.
JACKSON ET AL., ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS 34–50 (2003), and DOUGLAS G. BAIRD
ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994) (providing general background material for legal
professionals).
62

See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 61, at 4.

63

Theodore L. Turocy & Bernhard von Stengel, Game Theory 7 (Encyclopedia of Info.
Sys., Working Paper No. LSE-CDAM-2001-09, 2002).
64

Id.

65

Id.

66

See the discussion infra Sections III.2 and III.3.

67

Economists typically equate the players’ payoff to their utilities or their profits (if the
players are business firms). It is assumed that the players want to maximize their payoffs
regardless of the form they take. The specific numerical values of “Very High,” “High,” “Low,”
and “Very Low” do not matter in this game. All that matters to the analysis is that Very High >
High > Low > Very Low. If that is true, all of the analysis logically follows from the assumption
that the players will try to maximize their own payoffs.
68 As a matter of convention, the payoffs of each player from any combination of their
strategies are indicated in the cells of the matrix. The payoffs of the player who is identified on
the left-hand side of the matrix are written inside the cell first, and the payoffs of the player who
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Not-In-My-Backyard Game
Poor
Urban

Urban

Suburban

High, Low

Very High, Very
Low

Very High, Very
Low

High, Low

Rich
Suburban

The rationale for the payoff structure is simple: if Rich and Poor live in different
areas of the city, there will be no cross-subsidization between them, and Rich will be
able to live in an upscale neighborhood with well-kept homes and manicured
landscaping.69 All of Rich’s property and sales taxes will help to fund public services
that Rich alone will enjoy, such as schooling and policing; Poor will have to fund all
of her own consumption of public services from her own taxes, and Rich will be left
much better off than Poor. In addition, Rich will enjoy his surroundings living in an
upscale neighborhood, but Poor will not be able to share the aesthetic pleasure of
seeing well-kept homes and beautiful lawns and gardens.
If Rich lives in the same area of the city as Poor, however, Rich’s property and
sales taxes will help to subsidize Poor’s consumption of public services; moreover,
Rich will not necessarily be able to enjoy living in such an upscale neighborhood.
Although Poor’s taxes will help to fund Rich’s consumption of public services,
because Rich pays more taxes than Poor, Rich will provide a significant net subsidy
to Poor, thereby reducing Rich’s payoff and raising Poor’s payoff relative to the
outcomes in which they each live in different areas of the city. In addition, Poor may
enjoy living nearer to Rich’s well-kept home with its manicured landscaping, although
Rich may not derive so much pleasure from living closer to Poor’s more modest
housing situation. The structure of the payoffs in the Not-In-My-Backyard Game thus
captures the kernel of the strategic problem: Rich has an incentive to live in a different
area than Poor, but Poor has an incentive to live in the same area as Rich. 70

is identified on the top of the matrix are written in the cell second. The diagrammatic
representation of the game thus describes the players, their strategic options, and how their
strategic choices would determine their payoffs. That makes it a complete normal form
representation of the game.
69 The game represents the problem metaphorically. Thus, references to “Rich” or “Poor”
in the singular can be taken as references to rich people or affluent people generally. In other
words, if all rich people live together and away from poor people, then all their taxes will be
spent on public services for themselves. If rich and poor people live together, however, then the
rich people’s taxes will help to finance the public services enjoyed by poor people.
70

Because the game represents the problem metaphorically, it focuses on the core of the
problem. That is one of the strengths of using a normal form game. It also oversimplifies
problems and makes people seem much more self-serving and uncompassionate than they may
be. Nonetheless, almost everyone has heard people explain that they moved to a new
neighborhood because the schools are better, or they wanted to live in a safer neighborhood, or
they wanted to live in a “nicer” neighborhood. While people who say those things may not be
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Describing a normal form game is often easier than predicting how it will be
played. Game theory usually predicts the play of games using some solution concept.71
The most compelling predictions about the play of a game arise when the game has a
dominant strategy equilibrium.72 A dominant strategy equilibrium is an outcome of a
game in which each player chooses a dominant strategy;73 a dominant strategy is one
that is always best for the player no matter what strategy the other players choose. 74 In
a sense, therefore, a game does not have a strategic problem when it has a dominant
strategy equilibrium because each player has a strategic option that is always best no
matter what the other players choose to do. Unfortunately, the Not-In-My-Backyard
Game has a very difficult strategic problem at the core, and it certainly does not have
a dominant strategy equilibrium. In fact, most non-trivial games do not have dominant
strategy equilibria.75 The Nash equilibrium solution concept is therefore much more
commonly used to predict the play of games.76
A Nash equilibrium is an outcome of a game in which each player’s strategy is
best against the other players’ strategies.77 Every normal form game has at least one
Nash equilibrium, although the Nash equilibrium might be “mixed.”78 A Nash
equilibrium is “mixed” if it entails a player randomly choosing between two or more
“pure”79 strategies with certain probabilities.80 For example, in the school yard game
of “Stone, Paper, Scissors,” the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is for each player to
randomize his or her choice between the three alternatives with a one-third probability
for each.81 That probably accords with most people’s memories of actually playing the
game. Unfortunately, mixed strategy Nash equilibria are often not particularly
compelling. Although they might make sense for a school yard game like “Stone,
Paper, Scissors,” they do not seem to provide intuitive rationales for the play of
important real-world games in which the players have large payoffs at stake and time

as self-serving and uncompassionate as “Rich,” what they say reflects the same kind of
motivations.
71

See Turocy & von Stengel, supra note 63, at 4–5.

72

Id. at 12.

73

Id.

74

See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 61, at 44–45.

75

See Turocy & von Stengel, supra note 63, at 10.

76

The Nash equilibrium concept is named after John Nash, who was made famous by the
film “A Beautiful Mind.” For the book that the film was based upon, see SYLVIA NASAR, A
BEAUTIFUL MIND (1998).
77

See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 61, at 44–49.

78

Id.; see BAIRD ET AL., supra note 61, at 14; POUNDSTONE, supra note 61, at 55–59.

79

A “pure” strategy is simply one of the discrete strategic options described in the game.
For example, in the “Not-In-My-Backyard Game,” each player has two pure strategic options:
“Urban” or “Suburban.” See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 61, at 14.
80

See Turocy & von Stengel, supra note 63, at 3.

81

See id. at 17.
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to think through their options.82 Pure strategy Nash equilibria, however, are often
intuitively compelling if they exist and if they are unique.83
A pure strategy Nash equilibrium is an outcome of a game in which each player’s
pure—or non-randomized—strategy is best against the other players’ pure strategies.84
For example, in the well-known Prisoner’s Dilemma Game,85 the unique pure strategy
Nash equilibrium is for both of the prisoners to confess.86 When a unique pure strategy
Nash equilibrium exists, most game theorists would use it to predict the way the
players would play the game, especially if the players were knowledgeable about the
rules and experienced with the play of the game.87 Unfortunately, the Not-In-MyBackyard Game does not have a pure strategy Nash. In the Not-In-My-Backyard
Game, Poor is always best off choosing the same strategy as Rich, but Rich is always
best off choosing a different strategy than Poor. For example, if Rich chooses “Urban,”
then Poor’s best strategy is to also choose “Urban.” But, if Poor chooses “Urban,” then
Rich’s best strategy is to choose “Suburban.” The sad fact about the strategic problem
is that Poor always aspires to be near Rich, but Rich always aspires to escape from
Poor.88
Of course, the housing game has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, but the
strategy is completely implausible. If both players picked “Urban” and “Suburban”
with fifty percent probabilities, their strategies would be best against one another’s
strategies.89 But people do not choose where to live randomly, even with fixed
82 To make matters worse, some games have multiple Nash equilibria. When there are
multiple equilibria, finding any compelling reason to believe that any one of them is more likely
to be played than the others can be difficult.
83

Game theorists say there is a unique Nash equilibrium if there is one and only one Nash
equilibrium. See, e.g., Turocy & von Stengel, supra note 63, at 14 (showing the prisoner’s
dilemma as a game that has a unique Nash equilibrium).
84

See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 61, at 45–46.

85 Here is a version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game: Two suspects have been arrested.
The district attorney separates them and says to each, “if you do not confess, and your
accomplice does, you’ll get twenty years in jail and he’ll get a suspended sentence (with no
prison time); if you confess and your accomplice does not, you’ll get a suspended sentence (with
no prison time) and he’ll get twenty years.” But both suspects know that if neither of them
confesses they’ll only get five years each, and if they both confess they’ll both get ten years. It
is easy to reason in the Nash equilibrium of the game that both suspects will confess. For a
similar but slightly different rendition, see id. at 42–43.
86

See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 61, at 16.

87

THOMAS J. NECHYBA, MICROECONOMICS 883 (2010).

88

The depiction of the players, especially “Rich,” is admittedly bleak. But people often
aspire to move to neighborhoods that are “nicer,” have “better schools,” or are “safer.” If they
thought about it more, they might acknowledge that “nicer,” “safer” neighborhoods with “better
schools” usually are in affluent neighborhoods and that the neighborhoods are affluent because
there are no (or relatively few) poor residents living in them.
89

This is easy to prove: if Poor was equally likely to choose Urban or Suburban, then Rich
would be indifferent between Urban and Suburban. If he chose either of them with a fifty percent
probability, that would be the best he could do. If Rich was equally likely to choose Urban or
Suburban, then Poor would be indifferent between them, and if she chose either of them with a
fifty percent probability, that would be the best she could do.
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probabilities. Thus, with no pure strategy Nash equilibrium and an implausible mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium, predicting how the players in the Not-In-My-Backyard
Game would actually play is challenging.
The purpose of describing the Not-In-My-Backyard Game is not to realistically
predict people’s actual behavior so much as to expose some of the underlying
motivations that contribute to an important social phenomenon and have influenced
modern developments in property law. That said, the game is not empirically irrelevant
either; it depicts a scenario in which Rich will attempt to move away from the vicinity
of Poor, and Poor will attempt to move into the vicinity of Rich. Over the last several
decades, housing markets have frequently been roiled by significant migrations of
people and complete transformations of neighborhoods.90 The Not-In-My-Backyard
Game suggests the kind of turmoil and discontent that have characterized some local
housing markets for many years, as well as some of the motivations that have
contributed to the problems. But by itself, the game seems incomplete because there
are broader dimensions to the problems that the game does not capture. In fact, a larger
game is at play in people’s actual behavior—an inherently political game in which the
courts and legislatures determine the laws that shape people’s housing options and
decisions. The true purpose of the Not-In-My-Backyard Game is to shed light on those
larger forces.
B. A Bird’s Eye View
To fully comprehend the larger forces requires a broad perspective. But the NotIn-My-Backyard Game provides a useful vantage point from which to take a bird’s
eye view of the matter. One can summarize the kernel of the game with the observation
that Poor wants to live near Rich, but Rich wants to live away from Poor. Therefore,
both Rich and Poor have incentives to try to change the rules of the game to achieve
their preferred outcomes. Poor has an incentive to lobby for and, if possible, to help
devise laws and practices that will enable her to live near Rich. Rich, in contrast, has
an incentive to lobby for and, if possible, to help devise laws and practices that will
enable him to live away from Poor.
More precisely, the incentive for Poor to lobby for laws that will allow her to live
near Rich is the difference between earning Low and Very Low payoffs. Conversely,
the incentive for Rich to lobby for laws that will allow him to live away from Poor is
the difference between Very High and High payoffs. To be sure, at this level of
generality, it is not clear whose incentive is the strongest.91 As a practical matter,
however, the incentive effects are almost inevitably dominated by other important
factors, especially the relative power, influence, and political acumen of the parties.

90 The saddest and most obvious example is from observations of “racial tipping” and
“white flight.” In some cities, white residents have emigrated from historically white
neighborhoods as immigration of black residents into the neighborhood has reached a “tipping
point.” For seminal articles discussing this topic, see Thomas C. Schelling, Models of
Segregation, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 488, 488 (1969); Thomas C. Schelling, Dynamic Models of
Segregation, 1 J. MATH. SOC. 143, 143 (1971) [hereinafter Schelling, Dynamic Models].
91 In other words, it is not clear whether Very High minus High exceeds Low minus Very
Low. It might be possible to concoct some kind of explanation about why the former should
exceed the latter, but the matter is probably less important than other political considerations.
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One of the conundrums in the early literature on public choice was the purportedly
poor predictive power of Director’s Law. 92 Aaron Director93 proposed that in a
democracy, the net redistributive effect of the public sector should be to divert
resources from the poor and rich to the middle class. 94 His reasoning was that the
middle class comprises the largest number of voters and thus should dominate political
outcomes.95 If people are rational and significantly self-interested, therefore, the
political process should result in government tax and expenditure policies that
primarily work to the advantage of the middle class. 96
The theory is that middle class voters will use their voting power to elect legislators
who will levy taxes that disproportionately burden the rich and poor and use the tax
revenues for government programs and services that disproportionately benefit the
middle class.97 The poor and rich thus would end up subsidizing the middle class’s
consumption of public goods and services. 98 The idea is compelling but has
questionable empirical relevance.99 Evaluating the theory presents a problem because
of the difficulty in assessing the distribution of the benefits of government programs
and services,100 but the size of the impact, if any, seems less significant than one might
have imagined.101 Perhaps middle class voters are not as selfish as some might have
thought. It seems even more likely, however, that the influence of a political group
depends on much more than just the number of its votes and that wealth, income,
education, and social networks probably dwarf raw voting numbers in determining
political outcomes.102
92

Although the idea is commonly attributed to Aaron Director, he never published it. For
the seminal article on this topic, see generally George J. Stigler, Director’s Law of Public
Income Redistribution, 13 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1970). As an empirical matter, Director’s Law was
confounding because it was compelling intuitively, but the evidence was generally ambiguous.
For a recent survey, see Philipp Mohl & Oliver Pamp, Income Inequality, Redistributional
Spending & Director’s Law—An Empirical Investigation 1–2 (Paper presented at the Annual
IPES Meeting Philadelphia, Nov. 14–15, 2008).
93 Douglas Martin, Aaron Director, Economist, Dies at 102, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/16/us/aaron-director-economist-dies-at-102.html.
94

Stigler, supra note 92, at 1.

95

Id. at 9.

96

Id.

97

Id. at 2.

98

Id. at 3.

99

See, e.g., Mohl & Pamp, supra note 92, at 26. A more recent comparative study suggests
that Director’s Law might have more empirical support in some political systems than in others.
See Lars P. Feld & Jan Schnellenbach, Political Institutions and Income Redistribution:
Evidence from Developed Economies 1 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 4382, 2013).
100

Id. at 7.

101

Id. at 1.

102

As Joseph Stiglitz has observed, the connection between wealth and political influence
can lead to a vicious circle: “with the rich having more and more influence, they write the rules
of the political game to give themselves more power and influence, which means economic
inequality gets even more translated into political inequality, and the political inequality gets
translated into ever more economic inequality.” JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY
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There are many ways in which upper-middle class and wealthy voters wield
inordinate political influence. Their greater wealth and income allows them to
contribute more generously to political campaigns than less affluent voters. 103 Their
educations and professional expertise also provide them with a better understanding
and awareness of how political options impact their own interests and probably enable
them to participate in the process and pursue their interests much more effectively than
less educated and less professional voters.104
Moreover, because they often attend the same schools and work in the same jobs
as future legislators and judges,105 upper-middle class and wealthy voters generally
have considerably more social contacts with important political leaders than other
voters. This likely not only gives them a greater sense of ease in communicating their
interests and views to people in important political positions, it probably also gives
them considerably more opportunity to do so. Additionally, because judges,
legislators, and other political leaders are more likely to come from upper-middle class
or wealthy families, the political values, attitudes, and interests of political leaders
often coincide with the political values, attitudes, and interests of the upper-middle
class and rich voters.106 Nothing is more persuasive than shared beliefs and interests.
The inordinate influence of upper-middle class and rich voters on the political
process by itself tends to result in laws and policies that generally favor the affluent at
the expense of the less affluent.107 But there are other important forces at play.
Corporate actors play an often invisible but powerful role in politics at every level and
at every stage of the process,108 and corporate interests almost invariably coincide with
those of the voters who own the most property;109 those voters, of course, are
13 (2014), http://www.pas.va/content/dam/accademia/pdf/es41/es41-stiglitz.pdf. Moreover,
after analyzing the strength of an extensive study of policy making over a period of twenty
years, Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page concluded that “economic elites and organized
groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S.
government policy, while mass-based interest groups and average citizens have little or no
independent influence.” Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American
Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564, 572 (2014); see
generally MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE (2014); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE
OF INEQUALITY (2012).
103

Gilens & Page, supra note 102, at 566.

104

JEFFREY A. WINTERS, OLIGARCHY 31 (2011). This is not to suggest that elites know what
is best for country better than others; it is a suggestion that they are probably more adept at
using the political process. Gilens and Page reject the idea that elites “know better” in the former
sense. Gilens & Page, supra note 102, at 576.
105 Some theories of elite dominance emphasize such social connections. See Gilens & Page,
supra note 102, at 566.
106

Id.

107
Gilens and Page find that economic elites have a significant and independent impact on
public policy. In other words, their preferences have an effect on policy outcomes that is
separate from the effect of business or corporate interests. Id. at 572.
108 Dirk Matten & Jeremy Moon, Corporate Citizenship: Introducing Business as an Actor
in Political Governance, in CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP 2 (Dirk Matten et al. eds., 2013).
109 Charles Wheelan, It’s Official: In America, Affluence Equals Influence, U.S. NEWS &
(Apr.
22,
2014),
https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/charlesWORLD REP.
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predominantly upper-middle class or wealthy.110 Land speculators, property
developers, sports franchises, and large corporate employers with capital to invest in
property developments all have a huge influence on local governments and property
laws and policies.111 These influencers also appear to have had an important sway on
courts on matters ranging from mundane technical questions about the application of
land use regulations to important constitutional questions that laid the framework
within which modern property developments are undertaken. 112
In general, the fortunes of corporate actors are far more tightly intertwined with
those of upper-middle class and affluent voters than they are with those of the
working-class and poor.113 The upper-middle class and wealthy elites who occupy
many of the white collar managerial and professional jobs in major corporations, not
surprisingly, also (directly or indirectly) own a disproportionate share of the stock of
most publicly traded corporations. 114 Perhaps most importantly, many corporations
have stronger economic incentives to develop real properties, manufacture goods, or
provide services for upper-middle class and wealthy buyers than for less affluent
buyers.115 There are more expected profits from building luxury condominiums than
from building low-cost or affordable apartment buildings, or from developing
expensive beach front properties than from developing cheap land in neighborhoods

wheelan/2014/04/22/study-shows-wealthy-americans-and-businesses-control-politics-andpolicy?src=usn_tw.
110 The ways in which corporate actors influence political outcomes have been discussed
from a variety of perspectives. See THOMAS FERGUSON, GOLDEN RULE 347 (1995) (emphasizing
campaign financing); CHARLES LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS 170 (1977) (emphasizing
the economic power and privileges of corporations); WINTERS, supra note 104, at xvi
(discussing corporations as instruments of elitist oligarchies); Gilens & Page supra note 102, at
567 (discussing “biased pluralism”).
111 The relative influence of these groups, however, probably depends on the context and
issues. As William A. Fischel explains, “landowner-developers” have more influence in urban
and rural areas than in suburban ones where residents have such strong influence. Moreover,
land speculators may have more impact on urban sprawl through their economic decisions than
their influence on politicians. Corporations and sports franchises may have the most influence
when they are making locational decisions that encourage competition between municipalities
for their investments and spillover benefits. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING
LAWS 209–16, 265–66, 305–13 (1985).
112 Notably, corporations figured prominently in each of the three most important
constitutional cases bearing on land use developments during the twentieth century. See infra
Parts IV & V.
113 Thus, Gilens and Page find the correlation between business lobby groups and economic
elites’ interests is not statistically significant, but the correlation between business interest
groups and average citizens’ interests is negative and statistically significant. Gilens & Page,
supra note 102, at 571. As they point out, the association between the elites’ preferences and
the business interest groups’ preferences probably depends on the issues. Id. But there is no
question about who owns a proportionately larger stake in the corporate sector. See id.
114

Id. at 566.

115

Daniel Denvir, The Big, Big, Big, Big Money Behind Tall Buildings, CITYLAB (June 11,
2015), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2015/06/the-big-money-behind-tall-buildings/395690/.
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near wharfs or public transportation lines. 116 In the real estate market, therefore,
corporate profit incentives typically align much more strongly with the interests of the
affluent people who will buy high-end properties than they do with the less affluent
people who might help to build them.117 Not surprisingly, corporate actors also
typically favor property laws and policies that facilitate upper-middle class families’
interests in living separately from working-class and poor families in orderly, affluent
communities.118
For all these reasons and possibly others, property laws and policies tend to favor
the affluent at the expense of those less fortunate.119 The consequences are obvious.
To draw on the Not-In-My-Backyard Game analogy, it is as if Rich is able to fashion
new rules for the game that will enable him to exclude Poor from his environs. Of
course, there are two very different ways in which laws can help Rich achieve those
objectives. If Rich lives in an area with Poor as a neighbor and other areas are
undeveloped, he can devise laws that will prevent Poor from following him after he
decamps to an undeveloped area. Alternatively, if Rich lives near Poor and both the
city and the suburbs have been developed, he can devise laws that will allow him to
force Poor out of his neighborhood.
The former strategy is in many ways more discrete because it works by Rich
essentially building barriers that prevent Poor from taking action (moving to be closer
to Rich).120 Neither Rich nor Poor may think much about their motives or the
consequences.121 The latter strategy is more obtrusive because it works only by Rich
actively using the law to force Poor from an area in which she already lives. 122 Both
strategies, however, are overtly exclusionary, whether either player ever consciously
thinks about them.
In fact, one of the challenges in addressing the problem is that people often do not
seem to consciously think about the ways in which their choices and actions affect

116 This is possible because the land is owned by the developer, who wants to develop the
land to maximize the return on investment. But supply and demand conditions in the real estate
markets are also a factor. See id.
117

See id.

118

Corporate interests may not always align with those of the upper-middle class and
wealthy elites. Economic elites tend to favor small governments, and this puts them at odds with
the preferences of many business lobby groups that would prefer higher government spending
on health care or defense. See Gilens & Page, supra note 102, at 571. But it is almost certainly
true in the real estate industry.
119

Konstantin Sonin, Why the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights, 31 J.
COMP. ECON. 715, 716 (2003); see Wheelan, supra note 109.
120 Poor’s inaction—her failure to follow Rich—might not be noticed; often, actions are
noticed more that inaction.
121
Rich may support zoning laws that ensure his neighborhood will remain upscale without
thinking about the fact that those laws will make the neighborhood unaffordable for Poor.
Similarly, Poor may realize that Rich supports laws that make his neighborhood upscale, but
she might not think that Rich supports those laws to make his neighborhood unaffordable for
her.
122

The action necessary to expel Poor would be observable, and Poor might very well resist
it, making it all the more evident.
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others.123 For example, well-educated, young urban couples who move to the suburbs
when they want to start having children normally do not think about the impact that
their migration will have on the educational opportunities for the children of less
affluent parents.124 If they do, they probably do not connect the matter with the larger
questions about zoning and housing policies.125 Even those who do understand the
problem might not translate their awareness into concrete support for legal reform, let
alone make alternative decisions about their own housing.
The externalities, of course, create a difficult collective action problem. 126 Many
progressive or liberal parents might prefer the idea of their children studying at schools
where the student body proportionately reflects the demographic and socioeconomic
diversity in their communities, but they may still be reluctant to send their children to
a school at which the students are disproportionately poor or from minority groups
(other than their own, if they happen to belong to a minority group themselves). 127
The same can be said about urban gentrification. A childless professional couple
might want to live closer to work, but they might not be enticed to do so if the urban
environment is blighted and offers few amenities and entertainment options. One of
the ways in which a city might make urban residency more attractive to affluent
taxpayers is by planning and helping to implement an urban renewal project that
facilitates residential and commercial property developments that will be attractive to
them.128
A major urban renewal project typically requires that other land uses be terminated
so that the properties can be redeveloped.129 Because the owners of those properties
123 Kathryn Buonantony, Mindfulness: Being Fully Aware of How Your Actions Affect
Others, ODYSSEY (July 6, 2016), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2015/06/the-big-moneybehind-tall-buildings/395690/.
124

Joshua Rosenblat & Tanner Howard, How Gentrification Is Leaving Public Schools
Behind,
U.S.
NEWS
&
WORLD
REP.
(Feb.
20,
2015),
https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/02/20/how-gentrification-is-leaving-publicschools-behind.
125

See id. On a more mundane level, how many parents who seek extra attention for their
children in school because they feel their children are being insufficiently challenged
consciously recognize that this would divert resources from other children?
126

A single couple might rightly doubt whether their principled decision to remain in a
neighborhood with weaker schools would make any appreciable difference. Of course, if a
hundred couples made a decision to remain in the neighborhood, that might make an important
difference.
127

The point is to explain the parents’ preference for living in an upscale neighborhood
rather than to rationalize or justify their beliefs about the educational quality of the schools in
poorer neighborhoods. There is reason to believe that there is no simple fix for the problem of
improving children’s educational opportunities. The evidence from studies of voucher programs
under which children from poor families have attended schools in upscale neighborhoods is
quite mixed. One recent study suggests the poor children had even worse outcomes. See Atila
Abdulkadiroglu et al., School Vouchers and Student Achievement: First-Year Evidence from the
Louisiana Scholarship Program 2–3 (Sch. Effectiveness & Inequality Initiative, Working Paper
No. 2015.06, 2015).
128

See infra Part V.

129

Urban Renewal: Acquisition of Redevelopment Property by Eminent Domain, 1964
DUKE L.J. 123, 123 (1964).
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sometimes refuse to sell them at the prices the redevelopers offer, the plans often can
be implemented only if the city exercises its takings powers.130 Until recently, local
governments’ takings powers were limited in ways that constrained urban renewal
projects.131 The expansion in those takings powers has allowed cities to implement
redevelopment plans that redevelop non-blighted neighborhoods and transfer private
property rights from some owners to others.132 The redevelopments often cannibalize
low-cost housing, replacing it with upscale urban condominiums or duplexes that are
priced beyond the means of the existing residents. 133 The affluent buyers of the new
properties rarely think about that. They often, however, pressure the city and police to
“clean up” their neighborhoods even further after they move in, by which they often
mean controlling or relocating the homeless and the services for poorer residents. 134
The problem is akin to the familiar one of racial tipping and white flight. 135 But it
is much more pervasive because at its core, it does not depend on the presence of
racism or any kind of social animus between or toward any social groups. 136 People
want the American Dream: they want to live in spacious homes on large, landscaped
lots in orderly, well-maintained neighborhoods; they want their children to go to the
best schools possible; and they want their entire families to feel safe and secure from
crimes and other hazards.137 They want as few nuisances from their neighbors as
possible, and they want the best public and private services possible.138 Even those
who cannot afford to live the American Dream may still have it; they may at least have
hopes of upward social mobility and the affluence that typically comes with it. 139

130

See id. at 124. References to the city here mean to include corporations or other agencies
established by the city for the purpose of encouraging urban redevelopment.
131

See id. at 125.

132

See infra Part V.

133

Wendell E. Pritchett, The Public Menace of Blight-Urban Renewal and the Private Uses
of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 46 (2003).
134 For example, see a story about the pressures on the city of San Diego to control the
homeless population in the wake of a spate of major urban redevelopments that were spurred
by a now-discontinued urban redevelopment agency. Lisa Halverstadt, Chaos and Confusion
Pervade Homeless Camps Downtown, VOICE OF S.D. (July 20, 2017),
http://www.voiceofsandiego.org/topics/news/chaos-and-confusion-pervade-homeless-campsdowntown/.
135

See Schelling, Dynamic Models, supra note 90, at 181.

136

Of course, the phenomenon of racial tipping and white flight can occur even if only some
residents are or are perceived to be racist. When people’s behavior is interdependent, it is
difficult to draw inferences about individual preferences from collective outcomes. Id. at 146.
137

See Heather Long, The American Dream: Rich Are Fearful for Its Survival, but Poor Still
Believe, CNN (Oct. 14, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/10/14/news/economy/americandream-poor-still-believe/index.html.
138 See id.; see also MyBankTracker, Why Your Decision to Live Upstairs or Downstairs
POST
(Sept.
9,
2014),
Will
Floor
You!,
HUFFINGTON
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/mybanktracker/why-your-decision-to-live_b_5574747.html.
139

See Long, supra note 137.
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C. Changing the Rules of the Game
Property laws have been developed and used in the modern era to facilitate affluent
and rich peoples’ aspirations to escape from the problems and nuisances of living in
poor neighborhoods in two important ways. One was through the enormous expansion
in the scope of government land use regulations and policies.140 The Supreme Court
of the United States in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty141 legitimized and facilitated
this important legal development, which has transformed land uses and housing
opportunities all around the country, allowing affluent suburban communities to enact
zoning regulations that effectively exclude less affluent groups from their
neighborhoods.142
The other way was through the significant expansion in the scope of the
government’s power of eminent domain, which occurred through holdings by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Berman v. Parker143 and more recently in Kelo
v. City of New London.144 The expansion in eminent domain has increasingly allowed
private developers and corporations to use their political influence to encourage
government takings to implement redevelopment projects that redound to their own
benefit and the benefit of affluent city residents, 145 often at the expense of much less
affluent and politically marginalized groups that have effectively been expelled from
the redeveloped urban neighborhoods.146 The sad truth is that land use regulations have
facilitated the flight of the affluent to neighborhoods where the poor and less affluent
cannot follow them,147 and government takings have often been used to gentrify poor
neighborhoods to make them more attractive to corporate investors and affluent
residents, often cannibalizing affordable housing in the process and driving less
affluent residents out of the neighborhoods they have lived in for many years. 148

140 See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.
26 (1954); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
141

Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 365.

142 Melvyn R. Durchslag, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., Seventy-Five Years Later:
This Is Not Your Father’s Zoning Ordinance, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 645, 647 (2001).
143

Berman, 348 U.S. at 26.

144

Kelo, 545 U.S. at 469.

145 Bianka Alexandria Bell, From 1890 to Today, Nothing’s Changed: Gentrification in
Harlem and the Abuse of Eminent Domain 21 (Spring 2016) (Senior Projects, Barc College),
https://digitalcommons.bard.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1185&context=senproj_s2016.
146

Id. at 21–23.

147

Id. at 28.

148

The problems have been widely documented in the media. See, e.g., Richard Florida,
This Is What Happens After a Neighborhood Gets Gentrified, ATLANTIC (Sept. 16, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/09/this-is-what-happens-after-aneighborhood-gets-gentrified/432813/.
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IV. ZONING: THE POWER TO EXCLUDE
Cities in the United States became interested in the use of local ordinances to
regulate land uses after the turn of the twentieth century.149 As city populations
burgeoned, nuisance problems became more acute; 150 because the common law of
nuisance provided at best a weak mechanism for resolving the conflicts and mitigating
the problems,151 cities used ordinances to regulate land owners’ behavior instead. 152
The earliest public land use regulations thus were essentially nuisance ordinances. 153
Later, as the automobile and electric railcars reduced transportation costs and
improved transportation opportunities, affluent residents left the inner cities to live the
American Dream of a house with a white picket fence and green lawn in suburban
neighborhoods.154 As cities grew and the suburbs expanded, suburban residents came
into conflict with the farm owners, small businesses, and other land owners who
preceded them.155 The tendency at the time was for cities to expand by annexing new
suburban communities.156 The cities would then enact ordinances to regulate the
nuisance problems.157 In early cases, the United States Supreme Court upheld the
nuisance ordinances against constitutional attacks.158

149

MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, THE ZONING OF AMERICA 22 (Peter Charles Hoffer et al. eds.,

2008).
150

Id.

151

Id.

152

Cities tried other ways of mitigating the problems. Individual owners brought private
nuisance suits, local governments brought public nuisance suits, and developers tried making
estates land defeasible and then began using restrictive covenants. But no way has proved as
effective as zoning. Id. at 17–22.
153

Id. at 26.

154

The conception of the “American Dream” has evolved as the country has evolved, and it
has not always or only been about living in a house with a white picket fence. See LAWRENCE
R. SAMUEL, THE AMERICAN DREAM 4, 9–10 (2012). The idea of the white picket fence and green
lawn probably dates to the garden city movement, which actually originated in a book by an
Englishman. See EBENEZER HOWARD, GARDEN CITIES OF TOMORROW 9 (F.J. Osborn et al. eds.,
M.I.T. Press Paperback ed. 5th prtg., 1973) (1902); see generally STANLEY BUDER, VISIONARIES
AND PLANNERS (1990); KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER (1985). Jane Jacobs,
possibly the most famous urban planning scholar of the twentieth century, even though she did
not have a college degree, derided the idea in JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT
AMERICAN CITIES (1961).
155

WOLF, supra note 149, at 17–22.

156

This was the pattern in Cleveland before the Village of Euclid case. Id. at 13.

157

Id. at 17–22. The early problems contributed to the “City Beautiful” movement, which
focused on fostering clean streets, fresh air, and improvements in sanitation as well as parks and
attractive residences. JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE
PLANNING AND CONTROL LAW 10 (1998).
158

In particular, see Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
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A. The Origins of Zoning in the United States
The early nuisance ordinances did not, however, regulate land uses in a
comprehensive and systematic way. Most significantly, they did not separate land uses
in the way that zoning ordinances typically do.159 The first city to adopt a
comprehensive scheme of zoning ordinances was New York. 160 After the turn of the
twentieth century, New York absorbed waves of new European immigrants and
spawned an array of new manufacturing firms, which often employed the new
immigrants.161 The commingling of older residents with new ones and nuisance-some
commercial and industrial businesses created an avalanche of nuisance issues and
congestion problems. 162
Some New Yorkers learned about the uses of local laws to regulate similar
problems in Germany, and they looked to the experiences of German cities to advocate
for similar laws in New York. 163 New York thus enacted the first zoning laws in the
United States in 1916.164 Other cities, including Cleveland, soon followed.165 In fact,
Cleveland, and most of the other followers, looked to New York for inspiration. 166 The
United States Department of Commerce aided the zoning movement and sponsored
the drafting of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (“SSZEA”). 167 Most states
subsequently adopted SSZEA, and it helped clarify and institutionalize city
governments’ authority to enact zoning laws. 168
Progressive reformers played an important role in pressuring city governments to
adopt zoning schemes.169 During the early twentieth century, Progressive reformers
believed that professional experts could use laws and regulations to create better
communities and provide better lives for American citizens.170 Progressives during

159

See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 157, at 22.

160

See id.

161

WOLF, supra note 149, at 140–41.

162

This comingling also fostered some xenophobia and racism. Id.

163 As advocates attempted to rally support for a comprehensive zoning scheme in New York
City, they sought to publicize their ideas in the media. As an example, see an article written by
Frank B. Williams, Special Counsel to the New York Heights of Buildings Committee. See
generally Frank B. Williams, Germany Can Aid New York in Skyscraper Problem, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 21, 1913.
164
The impetus for a zoning scheme in New York was significantly increased by upscale
Fifth Avenue retailers who wanted to prevent textile factories, with large numbers of immigrant
employees, from moving into their area. WOLF, supra note 149, at 140–41.
165

Id.

166

Id.

167

Id. at 29.

168

Id.

169

Id. at 23–31.

170

Id. at 30.
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that era, however, often advocated various kinds of segregation.171 In fact, there is little
doubt that cities were often motivated to adopt zoning schemes not just to alleviate
true nuisance problems, but also to help more affluent property owners exclude
“undesirables” who might migrate into their neighborhoods.172 The “undesirables”
typically included anyone who was not Caucasian and Christian; in the early twentieth
century, they were often recent immigrants from Eastern Europe.173 In New York City,
for example, upscale retailers on Fifth Avenue made concerted and coordinated efforts
to exclude garment factories and their poor Eastern European immigrant employees
from their proximity and ultimately supported New York’s first zoning laws. 174 The
retailers’ motivations may have reflected racial and ethnic animus, but they also
reflected economic interests because the retailers wanted to preserve upscale
environments for their upscale stores.175
There is significant evidence that anti-Semitism provided some motivation for the
enactment of zoning laws,176 but there is little question that they were also motivated
by property owners’ interests in “stabilizing” property values—in other words, in
preventing property values from declining because of an influx of “undesirable,” lowincome residents into their neighborhoods. 177 The property owners’ prejudices and
self-interests typically coincided with those of the reformers because many
Progressives regarded the immigrants as impediments to good government and orderly
communities and believed that the further development of suburbs populated by white,
middle-class homeowners would spur social reform.178 The Progressives’ advocacy of
socio-economic and ethnic segregation should come as no surprise because it is wellknown that during the same period, they also usually advocated for racial
segregation.179
At the time, the United States Supreme Court frequently used the liberty of contract
doctrine to declare government regulations unconstitutional and thus to limit the scope
of the government’s regulatory powers.180 Many pundits thus believed the Court would
171

MICHAEL MCGERR, A FIERCE DISCONTENT 187–94 (2003). As McGerr documents, many
Progressive reformers around the turn of the twentieth century were overt racists by today’s
standards. Id.
172

WOLF, supra note 149, at 138–43.

173

Id.

174

Id. at 140.

175

Id.

176

Id. at 83–84.

177

Id.

178

Id. at 31.

179

MCGERR, supra note 171, at 187–94.

180

David N. Mayer, Substantive Due Process Rediscovered: The Rise and Fall of Liberty of
Contract, 60 MERCER L. REV. 563, 563–64 (2009). Interestingly, Professor Mayer argues that
the Supreme Court’s application of the liberty of contract doctrine during the early twentieth
century often protected vulnerable groups from exploitation by others. Id. at 644–45. So does
James Ely, who observed that the substantive due process doctrine “often safeguarded the
interests of vulnerable and powerless segments of society,” James W. Ely, Jr., Reflections on
Buchanan v. Warley, Property Rights, and Race, 51 VAND. L. REV. 953, 972 (1998).
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soon enough declare the use of zoning ordinances to regulate land uses
unconstitutional, too.181 Nonetheless, some time passed before the question was put to
the Court. In fact, the earliest challenges against zoning schemes were made in state
courts.182
In Clement v. McCabe, the Supreme Court of Michigan struck down a Detroit
zoning ordinance on the grounds that the city did not have the inherent power to enact
such laws and the state had not delegated the power through any zoning enabling act.183
In In re Opinion of the Justices, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts advised
the state legislature that a proposed zoning scheme would be constitutional. 184
Similar questions had been posed in Ohio courts before the United States Supreme
Court addressed them. In State ex rel. Morris v. East Cleveland in 1919, an Ohio court
treated a landowner’s takings claim as a substantive due process claim and held that
the East Cleveland zoning law under which a developer was denied a permit to build
an apartment house was within the city’s police powers.185 In State v. Durant, an Ohio
court affirmed the denial of a building permit for an apartment building as a matter of
state law, even though the court acknowledged that the constitutionality of zoning laws
was questionable as a matter of federal law.186 It remained to be seen, however,
whether the United States Supreme Court would uphold the new zoning schemes.
B. Euclid
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. was the first legal challenge launched
against a comprehensive zoning scheme in a federal court. 187 The Village of Euclid’s
zoning laws were modelled on the template provided by New York City, featuring
use, height, and area restrictions188 and defining the use restrictions cumulatively.189
Perhaps surprisingly, Ambler Realty challenged Euclid’s zoning scheme because
some of the land it owned near the Nickel plate railroad had been restricted against
industrial uses, not because it had been restricted against any residential uses.190
181

WOLF, supra note 149, at 119.

182

Id. at 43.

183

Clements v. McCabe, 177 N.W. 722, 726 (Mich. 1920).

184

IN RE OPINION OF THE JUSTICES, 127 N.E. 525, 532 (MASS. 1920).

185

State ex rel. Morris v. City of East Cleveland, 22 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 549, 549 (1920).

186

State v. Durant, 2 Ohio Law Abs. 75, 75 (1923).

187

WOLF, supra note 149, at 43.

188

The entire area of the village was divided into six use districts, three height districts, and
four area districts. The use districts regulated land uses, the height districts regulated the heights
of structures, and the area districts established the minimum lot sizes for particular uses. The
scheme also regulated lot widths as well as front and rear yards. Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 265, 380–92 (1926).
189

The most restricted zones limited uses to single-family residences and a small number of
other uses that would not destroy the single-family residence character of the neighborhood,
and each successively less restricted zone allowed additional uses cumulatively. Thus, singlefamily residential uses were allowed in all zones, but duplexes and apartment houses were not.
Id. at 380–81.
190

Id. at 379–80.
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Ambler’s complaint alleged that the zoning laws significantly diminished the value of
their land because it would be worth much more in industrial uses.191 Ambler claimed
that the laws therefore deprived it of property without due process of law under the
Fourteenth Amendment.192 At the time, courts and litigants frequently confounded
substantive due process claims and takings claims.193 Nonetheless, Ambler clearly was
challenging the zoning scheme as a whole, rather than the application of some part of
the scheme against it.194
There were many ways in which the Euclidean zoning scheme promised to
increase the property values of affluent homeowners as well as commercial and
industrial land users and probably also to limit the housing opportunities of poor and
working-class people.195 First, the scheme clearly limited the supply of land available
for commercial and industrial uses.196 Because Ambler’s land was adjacent to the
railroad line, it would have been particularly useful for business purposes; although
some of the land was zoned to allow industrial uses, much of it was not.197 Of course,
the scarcity of commercial and industrial land could only increase its value per acre.
In fact, if all of Ambler’s land had been zoned for industrial uses, Ambler probably
would not have challenged the ordinance and might even have been pleased about it.198

191

Id. at 384–85.

192

Id. at 384. Ambler made a variety of other claims too, but the case has come to stand for
the Supreme Court’s rejection of substantive due process claims against local governments’
powers to enact zoning laws. Id. at 384, 387.
193

In fact, the trial court struck the zoning scheme, questioning both its reasonableness and
condemning the confiscation of Ambler’s property without compensation. WOLF, supra note
149, at 55–56. The confusion is understandable because Ambler’s argument included claims
about the size of its economic losses even though the case arose long before the Supreme Court
articulated a theory of regulatory takings. Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 384. The Supreme
Court, however, appeared to treat the case as one about substantive due process. WOLF, supra
note 149, at 103–05. To this day, courts and attorneys at times struggle to distinguish the
government’s police powers from its takings powers. WOLF, supra note 149, at 91. In fact, at
least one scholar has argued that the Supreme Court continues to confound substantive due
process takings cases, now more commonly using the Takings Clause to strike laws that should
be stricken under the substantive due process doctrine. See Kenneth Salzberg, “Taking” as Due
Process or Due Process as “Takings”?, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 413, 414–16 (2002).
194

Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395–96.

195

Id. at 384.

196

As a general matter, single-family residential uses were the least restricted, multi-family
residential uses were the next least restricted, commercial uses were the second most restricted,
and industrial uses were the most restricted. In theory, the supply of land for particular uses
would be greater the less restricted the uses. Id. at 380–81.
197
The part of Ambler’s tract that was closest to the railroad line was zoned for commercial
and industrial uses, but the part closer to Euclid Avenue was not. Id. at 382.
198

If all of Ambler’s land allowed all industrial uses, it would have been unrestricted and
Ambler would have had no grounds for any claim. Even if it had been subject to some minor
restrictions on the types of industrial uses, however, Ambler may have been satisfied and even
pleased with the scheme given the way it limited the supply of land for industrial uses and
presumably raised its price.
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In some sense, the case arose because Ambler did not get a cut of the pie, not because
there was no pie to share.
Second, the Euclid scheme carved out a hierarchy of residential uses, with singlefamily residences at the apogee of the pyramid.199 The scheme restricted multi-family
residential uses more severely, thus allowing affluent homeowners to segregate
themselves from less affluent residents in neighborhoods restricted to expensive
single-family homes.200 Moreover, the areas zoned exclusively for single-family
residences generally were separated from particularly noxious uses that might
significantly threaten the residents’ health and safety by at least one other zone.201 The
scheme therefore not only facilitated the escape of affluent homeowners from the
proximity of “undesirables” and less affluent residents who would not be able to afford
the tonier neighborhoods, but it also promised to protect them from the most serious
health and safety hazards.202 This could only increase the value—and prices—of
properties in single-family neighborhoods.203 Of course, affluent homeowners would
always be willing to pay the higher prices necessary to buy their way into the more
expensive, exclusively single-family residential neighborhoods; less affluent and poor
families generally could not afford to do so.204
Third, the Euclid scheme clearly limited the housing options for poor and working
class families in ways that boded not only to limit their own life opportunities, but also
those of their children.205 For one thing, it created economic impediments to these
groups’ hopes to live in more affluent neighborhoods and consequently benefit from
more effective schools, more attentive policing, quicker emergency response times,
and better public services generally.206 Poor and working class families might dream
199

Id. at 380–81.

200

In fact, the restrictions on residential uses were even more specific: areas categorized U1
were limited to single-family residences (and some other conforming uses), areas categorized
U2 also allowed two-family dwellings (and some other conforming uses), and areas categorized
U3 also allowed apartment houses (and other conforming uses). The scheme thus allowed
families who could afford single-family residences to segregate themselves from all others, and
it allowed families who could afford two-family dwellings to segregate themselves from those
who could only afford to live in apartment houses. Id.
201

This is clear from perusing the city’s 1922 zoning map, which is posted on the city’s
website. PLANNING & ZONING COMM’N, CITY OF EUCLID, 1922 ZONING MAP (1922),
http://www.cityofeuclid.com/community/development/PlanningandZoningDivision/Euclidean
ZoningHistoricDocuments.
202

Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 391.

203

Although single-family residential uses were the least restricted of all, affluent
homeowners would pay more to live in exclusively single-family residential neighborhoods,
and the supply of land that was zoned exclusively for single-family residences was limited.
204

Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1924).

205

Id.

206

This is a common perception even if it is not always the reality. See, for example, the
following quote attributed to Spike Lee about gentrification in his boyhood neighborhood in
Brooklyn:
I grew up here in Fort Greene. I grew up here in New York. It’s changed. And why does
it take an influx of white New Yorkers in the south Bronx, in Harlem, in Bed Stuy, in
Crown Heights for the facilities to get better? The garbage wasn’t picked up every . . .
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of significantly improving their economic circumstances, but unless they actually
realized their dreams, they would never be able to afford the high property prices in
exclusive, affluent neighborhoods. Moreover, they could hardly be unaware that their
economic circumstances might limit their children’s futures as well as their own
opportunities. And because they would normally be consigned to living in mixed use
areas, the demand for scarce commercial and industrial land would drive up property
prices even there.
Even more insidiously, however, the Euclid scheme would result in many poor and
working class families living closer to health and safety hazards than more affluent
families because areas zoned for multi-family dwellings were not separated from
noxious or dangerous commercial and industrial land uses as much as areas zoned for
single-family residences.207 Because such dangerous and noxious land uses were
among the most serious nuisance problems that the zoning laws were supposed to
mitigate, this illustrates whose interests the laws primarily served. In fact, the Euclid
scheme promised to make the poor and working class yearn for the relatively clean
and safe tranquility of upscale suburban neighborhoods even more, which meant that
this class would derive even less satisfaction from the neighborhoods they could
afford.208 The children of poor and working class parents would not only suffer the
disadvantage of inferior public schools and congestion, they would also be more likely
to contract diseases and illnesses and become the victims of accidents and crimes. 209
C. Exclusionary Zoning
At the time the Village of Euclid case came up, the United States Supreme Court
was wont to strike government regulations using the liberty of contract doctrine under
the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.210 Although the Court
couched the liberty of contract doctrine in different language and applied it much more
broadly, vestiges of the doctrine today reside in the Court’s substantive due process
jurisprudence.211 Under the substantive due process doctrine today, the Court would
strike down a regulation that impinges on non-fundamental rights only on the grounds
day when I was living in 165 Washington Park. P.S. 20 was not good. . . . The police
weren’t around.
Inae Oh, Spike Lee’s Incredible Gentrification “Rant” Is Backed by Solid Facts, HUFFINGTON
POST (Feb. 26, 2014) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/26/ spike-leegentrification-_n_4856847.html.
207

The City of Euclid’s 1922 zoning map shows most of the land zoned U3 to allow
apartment houses is adjacent to land zoned U6 to allow some of the heaviest types of industrial
uses. See PLANNING & ZONING COMM’N, supra note 201 and accompanying text.
208 See generally Claeys, Euclid Lives, supra note 6, at 731; Charles M. Haar & Michael
Allan Wolf, Euclid Lives: The Survival of Progressive Jurisprudence, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2158
(2002).
209

WOLF, supra note 149, at 59.

210

Mayer, supra note 180, at 563–64.

211

David Mayer argued that the Supreme Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence
transitioned from a presumption in favor of liberty to a rational basis analysis as the liberty of
contract language phased out and the modern substantive due process doctrine emerged. Id. at
652–53.
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that it was not rationally related to a legitimate state interest.212 But even from a
modern perspective, one can argue that the Euclid zoning scheme—and myriad other
zoning schemes then and now—raises a substantive due process issue. Was the Euclid
scheme rationally related to a legitimate state interest? Is there any legitimate state
interest in segregating people by income and wealth or in protecting some children
from noxious harms and not others? Or were some important parts of the Euclid
scheme, in the Supreme Court’s own language, “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable,
having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare?”213
One of the hallmarks of Euclid’s zoning scheme—and the hallmark of Euclidean
zoning schemes still today—is the system of cumulative land uses.214 The cumulative
land uses not only apply across qualitatively different types of uses, such as residential,
commercial, and industrial, they also apply within those types of uses. 215 Thus, some
zones are restricted to single-family residences, meaning that the owners of the singlefamily residences will be protected against the risk of having multi-family dwellings
in their neighborhoods.216 Of course, this means that anyone who cannot afford a
single-family residence in such a restricted neighborhood will be restricted against
living in one.217 But this raises the question: why is there any legitimate state interest
in preventing people from living in multi-family dwellings near single-family
residences?
It is not possible to base any plausible answer to the question on nuisance
principles. One might, for example, argue an apartment building would block sunlight
or air or cause traffic congestion and assert this justifies restricting some residential
neighborhoods against tall apartment buildings. 218 But if a tall apartment building
might create such nuisances, why not make it subject to a special permit based on
criteria that would mitigate and control the nuisances? Moreover, it would be well to
remember that the Euclid zoning scheme—and many modern Euclidean zoning
schemes—included height and area restrictions as well as use restrictions;219 the height
restrictions could have been devised to prevent tall apartment buildings in any
residential neighborhood whether or not the scheme restricted types of residential
uses. Not all multi-family dwellings—or apartment buildings—are tall, block air and
light, or create inordinate congestion. Duplexes, row housing, and two- or three-story
apartments may not, and multi-family housing does not, necessarily create those kinds
of nuisance problems.

212

Id. at 653–54.

213

Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 265, 395 (1926).

214

JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 157, at 82–84.

215

Id. at 83.

216

Id. at 82.

217

Id. at 83.

218 Justice Sutherland made references to nuisances such as these in his Village of Euclid
opinion, but his references were not persuasive or compelling. See Village of Euclid, 272 U.S.
at 394.
219

Id. at 380–81.
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In fact, the Euclid zoning scheme itself undermines any nuisance rationale. For
one thing, it allowed electric railway stations in zones restricted to single-family
residences,220 which likely would have created significant congestion.221 Perhaps that
congestion was tolerated because it was caused by facilities that would benefit more
affluent residents of single-family dwellings and not by residents of multi-family
dwellings.222 Regardless, the tolerance of some congestion nuisances undermines any
congestion rationale for the restrictions against multi-family dwellings. Moreover, if
residential restrictions have a nuisance rationale, one could ask why this rationale only
applies to affluent people who can afford single-family residences. Why does it not
also protect residents of multi-family dwellings from buildings that block air, sun, and
congestion? Perhaps most important of all, one could ask why the scheme protects
affluent families in single-family homes from commercial and industrial uses but not
families who live in multi-family dwellings. Are regulations that protect the health,
welfare, safety, and morals of affluent families but not poor ones rationally related to
any legitimate state interest? Where is the rationality in that?
There are other characteristics of Euclid’s zoning scheme that obviously increase
the cost of housing and have other exclusionary effects.223 Most of these—and
others—are still manifest in zoning laws across the country. For example, area,
setback, and frontage requirements can all increase the cost of housing in upscale
residential neighborhoods.224 These requirements have all been criticized for having
exclusionary effects, whether or not that was the intent.225
It is debatable whether there is any legitimate state interest in many restrictions
like these too.226 Although some of them may mitigate nuisances (e.g., minimum
setbacks may reduce fire risks), this does not explain why the restrictions should be
more binding in some residential zones than in others. 227 If reducing fire risk between
single-family residences (or duplexes or apartment buildings) requires some minimum

220

Id. at 380.

221

Id. at 391.

222

Id. at 394.

223

This was especially true of the area restrictions. Id. at 381–82. The Euclid scheme also
had setback, yard size, and other requirements that would have increased housing costs. See
CITY OF EUCLID, ZONING ORDINANCE NO. 2812 AND AMENDING ORDINANCE NO. 5421, §§ 16–
22
(1927),
http://www.cityofeuclid.com/community/development/PlanningandZoningDivision/Euclidean
ZoningHistoricDocuments.
224 THOMAS F. GESELBRACHT, ILLINOIS ZONING, EMINENT DOMAIN AND LAND USE MANUAL,
§§ 3-3(b)(2)(i)–(v) (2017).
225 The Supreme Court of New Jersey famously struck Mount Laurel’s zoning scheme
because it included exclusionary restrictions such as these. S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Twp.
of Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 729 (N.J. 1975).
226 A Practical Guide to Understanding Zoning Laws, PROPERTYMETRICS (Jan. 6, 2017),
https://www.propertymetrics.com/blog/2017/01/06/zoning-laws/.
227

Id.
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setback, such setbacks should be the same regardless of the zone. 228 The restrictions
are usually defined in ways that suggest they have aesthetic purposes.229
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted state interests to extend to
aesthetic considerations,230 but many disagree with the idea that the government
should regulate the aesthetic character of our residential communities rather than let
the communities themselves do so through private land use restrictions. 231 After all,
beauty is and should be in the eyes of the beholders, not those of judges or justices
sitting on courts of law.
At the time of Village of Euclid, one can easily imagine how and why the Euclidean
zoning scheme might be struck. In fact, the trial judge did strike the scheme. 232 His
opinion cut straight to the core of the scheme’s issues and accurately predicted how
zoning schemes like the one in Euclid would ultimately segregate people along
socioeconomic lines as well as other characteristics, such as race, ethnicity, and
religion that might be correlated with them.233 In a famous opinion, Judge
Westenhaver observed:234
The plain truth is that the true object of the ordinance in question is to place
all the property in . . . a strait-jacket . . . . In the last analysis, the result to
be accomplished is to classify the population and segregate them according
to their income or situation in life. The true reason why some persons live
in a mansion and others in a shack, why some live in a single-family
dwelling and others in a double-family dwelling, why some live in a twofamily dwelling and others in an apartment, or why some live in a well-kept
apartment and others in a tenement, is primarily economic. It is a matter of
income and wealth, plus the labor and difficulty of procuring adequate
domestic service.235
In fact, Judge Westenhaver predicted at the outset of his opinion that the case
would reach the United States Supreme Court. 236 The Supreme Court, for its part,
could hardly have been unaware of the ways in which Euclidean zoning would
segregate people in light of Judge Westenhaver’s trenchant opinion. 237 In fact, the
228

Id.

229

See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 157, at 559–76.

230

Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).

231 Not surprisingly, many have criticized Berman. See, e.g., Martin Anderson, The
Sophistry That Made Urban Renewal Possible, 1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 200, 206–07 (1965);
Kenneth Regan, You Can’t Build That Here: The Constitutionality of Aesthetic Zoning and
Architectural Review, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1013, 1026–31 (1990); see generally
JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 157, at 559–76.
232

Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid 297 F. 307, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1924).

233

Id.

234

Id. at 308.

235

Id. at 316.

236

Id. at 308.

237 That is not to mention the extensive representations that were made to the Court by
advocates and experts. See generally WOLF, supra note 149, at 57–93. In fact, the issues were
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underlying issues were as transparent then as they are now, and there is compelling
evidence that the Supreme Court justices understood them. 238 Given the propensities
of the conservative justices on the Court at the time, many attorneys predicted that the
Court would strike the Euclidean scheme.239 But perhaps the pundits underestimated
those justices’ empathy with the affluent and influential parties who stood to benefit
from the Euclid scheme240 because, quite to the surprise of many, the Court’s opinion
provided a sweeping endorsement of local land use regulations. 241
Most people interpreted the decision to authorize many of the exclusionary
restrictions that most local governments continue to use to this day.242 Unfortunately,
the language in which the Court couched its opinion reeked of elitism and socioeconomic prejudice.243 In hindsight, the Village of Euclid opinion ranks among the
Court’s greatest embarrassments, but the Court’s social attitudes reflected some of the
underlying motivations for many zoning laws at that time and to the present day.
D. The Long Road Ahead
Once regulations that have important redistributive effects become entrenched,
they are very difficult to repeal, especially if they redistribute wealth in favor of those
with the most political power and influence. Thus, even though many widely
acknowledge the exclusionary effect of zoning, 244 there is little to no chance of
unraveling zoning schemes at the local level of government in established
neighborhoods.245 In fact, the efforts to address exclusionary zoning at the state and
city levels have typically been limited to the enactment of inclusionary zoning laws.246
well-known, and several state courts had upheld the segregation of single-family residential
neighborhoods from apartment houses. Id. at 108–10.
238

By the time the case rose to the Supreme Court, planning experts, politicians, and
attorneys had already had wide-spread discussion and debate about zoning. There was widespread support for zoning laws that cut across fields of expertise and political parties as well as
every region of the nation. Id. at 118–19.
239

Milton Handler, who would later become a renowned professor at the Columbia
University Law School, was a clerk of Justice Stone at the time, and he thought the conservative
justices on the Court would combine to strike the Euclid ordinance. He described the outcome
as surprising because of the way both Justice Sutherland and Justice Taft changed their alliances.
Id. at 89–90.
240 Much of the advocacy in support of the Euclid zoning scheme emphasized its “positive”
effects on property prices. Experts from a variety of fields, politicians from both ends of the
political spectrum, and editorial writers widely agreed and publicized the matter. Id. at 89, 119.
241

Id. at 111.

242

Id. at 110.

243

Justice Sutherland’s opinion is famous for its “pig in the parlor” metaphor, but other parts
of it can make one cringe. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
In particular, the part in which he writes that “the apartment . . . is a . . . parasite” reflected a
callous indifference to the dignity of people who could only afford to live in apartment houses.
Id. at 394.
244

JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 157, at 268–301.

245

Id. at 284.

246

Id. at 282–85.
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In some respects, inclusionary zoning laws simply entrench the inequalities even
deeper.247 By increasing the cost of housing in the already tony affluent
neighborhoods, they make them even less affordable to working class and poor
families.248 Affordable housing provided through inclusionary zoning laws is typically
constructed in less affluent neighborhoods and is often, as one might expect, multifamily housing.249 Housing remains segregated, but the laws at least provide some
cover for political leaders who can claim to be doing something about it. 250 In the
meantime, the rich get richer and market rate housing becomes even more
unaffordable for working class and poor families. 251
There is no simple solution to the problems that bad zoning laws have created. One
thing seems clear, however: since government actions created the problem, it would
be foolish to rely on further government actions to solve it. In the long-run, the best
solution to the problem would be to limit governments’ zoning powers so that those
with inordinate political influence are not able to use it to their advantage.252 Because
state governments are unlikely to amend their zoning enabling statutes, courts could
help by using the substantive due process doctrine to strike zoning laws that restrict
some residential uses against other residential uses or that serve no purpose other than
to raise housing costs.253 This would not immediately change the way anyone lived, or
cause any significant and pervasive changes in housing prices, because homeowners
in well-established, upscale neighborhoods would not immediately alter their land
uses; but it would allow for more incremental changes in land uses. 254 Perhaps over
the longer course, as the existing housing stock depreciates and renovations are
required, neighborhoods would become more integrated, and some of the damage
could be undone.
It would take great courage for the Supreme Court to revise its zoning
jurisprudence, but that would also set the law and the country on a freer and fairer
247

Id. at 284.

248 This concern was expressed relatively soon after inclusionary zoning laws were first
enacted. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of Inclusionary Zoning, 54 S. CAL L. REV. 1167,
1170 (1981) [hereinafter Ellickson, The Irony of Inclusionary Zoning]. There is still not much
systematic empirical evidence, but some of it certainly suggests that the concerns were wellfounded. See, e.g., The Effects of Inclusionary Zoning on Local Housing Markets: Lessons from
the San Francisco, Washington DC and Suburban Boston Areas, FURMAN CTR. REAL EST. &
URB. POL’Y (Mar. 2008), http://furmancenter.org/files/publications/IZPolicyBrief.pdf;
Benjamin Powell & Edward Stringham, Housing Supply and Affordability: Do Affordable
FOUND.
(Apr.
1,
2004),
Housing
Mandates
Work?,
REASON
http://reason.org/news/show/housing-supply-and-affordabili.
249 Myron Curzan & Marta Lopez, Affordable Multifamily Housing: Paths to a Painless
LAND
(June
26,
2014),
https://urbanland.uli.org/industrySolution,
URB.
sectors/residential/producing-affordable-multifamily-housing-paths-painless-solution/.
250

Ellickson, The Irony of Inclusionary Zoning, supra note 248, at 1206–09 (arguing that
inclusionary zoning is sometimes an exclusionary tactic in disguise).
251

Powell & Stringham, supra note 248.

252

Bell, supra note 48, at 568.

253

This may seem unlikely too, at least in some states. Perhaps alternative routes could be
taken in different jurisdictions.
254

See Bell, supra note 48, at 557–73.
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course. If the United States Supreme Court is unwilling to strike exclusionary zoning
laws, state supreme courts should do so under their state constitutions. This would at
least advance justice in some states, and that justice might become contagious. Of
course, state courts have not rushed to strike exclusionary zoning laws either, and we
would be foolish to wait with bated breath for that to happen. In the long run, perhaps
the greatest hope is for a change in social attitudes and political ideals that might then
drive a more fundamental change in judicial attitudes and political outcomes.
V. TAKINGS: THE POWER TO EXPEL
The State’s power of eminent domain raises special concerns “because it requires
the use of the State’s coercive powers against an individual.”255 Government takings
therefore are inherently problematic, but the dangers are compounded when the
government’s takings powers are wielded on behalf of powerful special interests. 256
Just compensation must be provided,257 but is rarely sufficient “to compensate
expropriated property owners fully for the subjective values that they place on [their
properties]”258 because it is generally calculated using estimates of market values
rather than the owners’ true subjective values.”259
[T]he market price in a well-functioning, competitive market (which is the
usual assumption for real estate markets) reflects the marginal valuation of
what is being sold–intuitively, the marginal value of the last property of
that type sold. Almost all buyers in such a market, however, are inframarginal, and they value the properties they buy more than the prices they
pay for them. That is why a well-functioning competitive market generates
. . . surplus [for buyers]. The surplus earned by any individual buyer is the
difference between the value they place on whatever it is they are buying
and the price they must pay to make the purchase. If a property owner is
compensated for a taking in an amount exactly equal to the market price,
she will lose all of the surplus value she enjoyed from her property. This .

255

Smythe, supra note 43, at 26–27. In a conventional taking, the State’s power is used to
take possession of land away from the individual owner. Id. at 27. The individual owner could
be a natural person or a corporate person. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469
(2005) (applying the takings clause to individuals); Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States
282 U.S. 481 (1931) (applying the takings clause to a corporation). Because all of the sticks in
the owner’s bundle are taken, the intrusion is much greater than that caused by a government
regulation, unless the regulation amounts to a regulatory taking. See Coniston Corp., v. Hoffman
Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 1988). Moreover, the government must take some overt
action against the individual; that overt action always makes the exercise of the government’s
coercion more obvious. See id.
256

Id.; see infra Part V.

257

Id. at 27; Bell, supra note 48, at 525.

258

Smythe, supra note 43, at 27; see Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844
F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Compensation in the constitutional sense is therefore not full
compensation, for market value is not the value that every owner of property attaches to his
property but merely the value that the marginal owner attaches to his property.”).
259

Coniston Corp., 844 F.2d at 464; Smythe, supra note 43, at 27.
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. . explains why most property owners are disgruntled when they are
subjected to a taking.260
Nonetheless, the government’s takings power is deeply rooted in the feudal
antecedents of American law.261 In fact, during the Colonial period, the Crown’s power
of eminent domain was apparently almost unrestricted and did not require just
compensation.262 The Magna Carta was the first written doctrine expressly restricting
eminent domain, and it forbid takings by the sovereign without some form of due
process.263
Although the extent of the due process requirement was subsequently disputed, it
manifested itself in the requirement, at the very least, for a hearing prior to any
confiscations of property by the Crown. 264 As the law developed, Sir Edward Coke
expounded on the common law restraints against the sovereign’s exercise of eminent
domain in his series on the Institutes of the Laws of England, 265 and William
Blackstone subsequently stressed the role of the common law as a restraint on the
power of the sovereign in his Commentaries on the Laws of England. 266 The record is
clear on not only the English sovereign’s power of eminent domain, but also on some
important restraints on that power that were entrenched under the common law by the
time English colonies were established on the North American continent.267
The American Revolution reflected a widespread belief among colonial Americans
that the power of the English sovereign was, and should be, limited.268 The Declaration
of Independence expressly stated the right of the people to revolt against their
governments when the governments abused and exceeded their rightful powers,269 and
the Bill of Rights, including the Fifth Amendment with its Takings Clause, was
incorporated into the United States Constitution to forestall the federal government

260 Coniston Corp., 844 F.2d at 464; Smythe, supra note 43, at 27; see DAVID M. KREPS,
MICROECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS I: CHOICE AND COMPETITIVE MARKETS 296–303 (2013).
261

Edward J. Sullivan, A Brief History of the Takings Clause, GARVEY SCHUBERT BARER
(Nov.
11,
2013),
http://www.gsblaw.com/newsroom-publicationsA_Brief_History_of_the_Takings_Clause. The sovereign’s exercise of its takings powers was
often challenged by the landed gentry and the emerging middle-class, but the sovereign
undoubtedly claimed takings powers. See id.
262 William Michael Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 695 (1985).
263

Id. at 698; Sullivan, supra note 261.

264

Sullivan, supra note 261.

265

Id.

266

Id.

267 See Treanor, supra note 262, at 697–98. The restraints did not, however, include a just
compensation requirement. Id.
268

See id. at 705.

269 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). But the Declaration of
Independence did not challenge the government’s right to take private property. See Treanor,
supra note 262, at 700.
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from assuming too much power.270 The United States Supreme Court eventually
incorporated the federal Takings Clause against the state governments under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R.
v. City of Chicago.271 Ironically, although the Fifth Amendment (as well as the
Fourteenth Amendment) included a Due Process Clause that provided the justification
for various restrictions on governments under the substantive due process doctrine, 272
the United States Supreme Court’s Takings Clause jurisprudence developed through
completely different precedents than its substantive due process jurisprudence. 273
This is unfortunate because the law might have developed more coherently if the
Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence had evolved along with the doctrine of
substantive due process. The Court’s modern test for a breach of substantive due
process for a law or regulation that implicates a non-fundamental right is whether the
law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.274 Because the Court has defined
the scope of legitimate state interests to extend to almost any matter involving the
public’s health, welfare, safety, or morals, the modern substantive due process
doctrine places few limits on government powers.275 Yet because the Court developed
its takings jurisprudence separately, there is now a body of cases in which the Court
has held that government laws or regulations have gone so far in impinging on private
property rights that they constitute takings and just compensation is required.276 In
fact, although the Court has not yet held so, it seems only logical that there may be
potential cases in which a law or a regulation actually exceeds the government’s
takings powers altogether. In such a case, the Takings Clause would limit government
powers but substantive due process probably would not, given the way the doctrine
has been applied in modern cases.277 That seems absurd because if a law or regulation
270

See Treanor, supra note 262, at 694, 708.

271

Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233–34 (1897).

272

See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV § 1.

273

For an overview of the literature, see Salzberg, supra note 193, at 416–23.

274

John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REV. 493,
499 (1997).
275

As the Supreme Court wrote in Berman v. Parker:

We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not desirable.
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. . . . The values it represents
are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of
the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. In the present
case, the Congress and its authorized agencies have made determinations that take into
account a wide variety of values. It is not for us to reappraise them. If those who govern
the District of Columbia decide the Nation’s Capital should be beautiful as well as
sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
276 Salzberg, supra note 193, at 414–19. Professor Salzberg discussed and critiqued the
regulatory jurisprudence. He argued that the courts should confine takings law to physical
takings and use the substantive due process doctrine to discipline the legislature’s regulatory
powers. Id. at 414, 418.
277

See id. 416–19.
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is beyond the government’s takings powers, how could it be rationally related to a
legitimate state interest?278
The United States Constitution expressly limits the government’s power of
eminent domain to cases where the taking is for a public use. The Supreme
Court’s definition of a public use thus defines the scope of the
government’s takings powers. . . . Historically, the Court defined public
uses narrowly, limiting the power of eminent domain to takings of land for
uses that would make the land open to the public or provide it to private
carriers who would make their transportation services open to the public.279
“In . . . recent cases, however, the Supreme Court has gradually expanded the scope
of permissible public uses” and it has even implied that it would allow takings for
almost any public purpose, including the redevelopment of blighted urban
neighborhoods280 and more recently the redevelopment of “non-blighted
neighborhoods as part of integrated redevelopment plans.”281 As a consequence,
government takings have become more common and the power of eminent domain
encumbers private property rights more than ever. Not surprisingly, this has generated
a profusion of legal scholarship, much of which has been critical of the Supreme
Court’s recent takings cases.282
A. The Limits of State Coercion
Most people abhor being subjected to coercion, whether it is by the government or
by other individuals. But most people probably believe that the government would be
justified in using coercion if such coercion was to prevent the exercise of coercion by
others. In this regard, it is well to note that coercion does not have to be physical.
Friedrich Hayek,283 for example, observes that a monopolist could exercise
278

This of course corroborates Professor Salzberg’s concerns. See id. 424–25.

279 Smythe, supra note 43, at 27–28. The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution contains the
express limitation of the government’s power. U.S. CONST. amend. V. For a useful overview of
the historical development of the public use requirement, see Justice O’Connor’s dissenting
opinion in Kelo. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 494–504 (2005) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
280

Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35 (1954); Smythe, supra note 43, at 28.

281

Kelo, 545 U.S. at 503–04; Smythe, supra note 43, at 28.

282

For a sample of this legal scholarship, see Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain
After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings,
29 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 491 (2006); Daniel H. Cole, Why Kelo Is Not Good News for
Planners and Developers, 22 GA. ST. L. REV. 803 (2006); Orlando E. Delogu, Kelo v. City of
New London—Wrongly Decided and a Missed Opportunity for Principled Line Drawing with
Respect to Eminent Domain Takings, 58 ME. L. REV. 18 (2006); Ashley J. Fuhrmeister, In the
Name of Economic Development: Reviving “Public Use” as a Limitation on the Eminent
Domain Power in the Wake of Kelo v. City of New London, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 171 (2005);
Gideon Kanner, Kelo v. New London: Bad Law, Bad Policy, and Bad Judgment, 38 URB. LAW.
201 (2006).
283 Hayek was an economist and a philosopher during the era of the Great Depression.
Keynes v. Hayek: Two Economic Giants Go Head to Head, BBC (Aug. 3, 2011),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-14366054.
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coercion.284 He offers the example of an oasis that the owner purchased when
alternative water sources were plentiful. 285 If the alternative water sources dried up,
and nearby residents had “no choice but to do whatever the owner of the spring
demanded of them if they were to survive,” this would be a “clear case of coercion.”286
This scenario does not imply that a monopolist always exercises coercion.287 Hayek
explains that a monopolist would only exercise coercion when he controlled “an
essential commodity on which people were completely dependent.”288 In other words,
“unless a monopolist is in a position to withhold an indispensable supply, he cannot
exercise coercion.”289
Hayek’s conception of coercion might allow for distinctions by matter of degree,
but it requires sufficient control of a person that he is forced to serve the ends of
another.290 In fact, there are many contexts in which monopoly power might be
considered coercive. One of them is the classic hold-up problem that is often used to
justify government takings.291 Consider the classic hold-up scenario: suppose the city
wants to build a public hospital on some city block. Assume that the city assigns a
value of $100 million to the hospital. Assume that the specific location of the hospital
does not matter, but the project requires an entire city block. Suppose the city has
budgeted $10 million for the purchase of all ten of the privately-owned properties on
a particular block, reasoning that each of the properties has a market value of less than
$1 million and that it should, therefore, be able to purchase each of them for $1 million.
Suppose that after spending $9 million on nine of the properties, the tenth property
owner refuses to sell. The tenth property owner has a monopoly on the last property
that the city needs to buy to build the hospital on that city block. On a superficial level,
it might appear that the tenth owner merely exercises her property rights by declining
to transfer her title to the city. But upon a little reflection, it seems clear that the tenth
owner is much more likely exercising the leverage of an owner with hold-up monopoly
power.
If the city’s only alternative is to buy up the properties on some other block, the
city theoretically would be willing to pay at least as much as the total cost of another
block to the tenth owner for that tenth property—that would be at least $10 million. In
theory, the owner of the tenth property would be in a position to extract from the city
at least the price of an entire city block for a property that was worth perhaps a tenth
of that amount on the market. Even if in reality the tenth owner has less leverage than
in theory, the scenario confers upon her a significant degree of coercive monopoly
power. The obvious solution to the problem is for the city to exercise the power of
284

FRIEDRICH A HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 203 (Ronald Hamowy ed., 2011).

285

Id.

286

Id.

287

Id.

288

Id.

289

Id.

290

Hayek defined coercion as “such control of the environment or circumstances of a person
by another that, in order to avoid greater evil, he is forced . . . to serve the ends of another.” Id.
at 71.
291

DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 15, at 1108–09 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 70–71 (8th ed. 2011)).
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eminent domain. In this context, the use of eminent domain would forestall the
exercise of coercion and advance liberty.292
B.“Expulsionary” Takings
The State’s exercise of eminent domain is problematic, however, when it is not
necessary to forestall coercion.293 Unfortunately, in the wake of Berman v. Parker and
Kelo v. City of New London,294 the government’s power of eminent domain is being
exploited for the gain of some individuals at the expense of others. 295 Government
takings have become an instrument that politically influential and powerful
individuals can and do use to exercise the levers of State coercion against politically
less influential and less powerful individuals.296 The most common abuses have
occurred through urban redevelopment programs under which takings have been used
to expel long-time residents and business owners from inner city areas to facilitate
economic development and urban gentrification.297 Stripped of all the rhetoric, the
motives for many of these urban redevelopment projects are similar to the motives for
many zoning laws,298 except they are better described as “expulsionary”299 than
exclusionary, because the redevelopments actually expel nuisance-some or
undesirable occupants or residents from a neighborhood and replace them with others
who will be attractive to more affluent residents and the businesses that serve them.300
C. Economic Development Takings and Gentrification
Kelo v. City of New London raised red flags in the early 2000s because it extended
the State’s power to take private property for the purposes of economic development
in areas that are not economically depressed.301 In Kelo, the City of New London
devised a plan to redevelop an area of the city that was not at all blighted.302 The plan
was motivated, it seems, by the city government’s wish to stimulate the local economy
and improve employment opportunities for residents. 303 To that end, the city’s plan
sought to encourage new private commercial and industrial investments by
condemning a large number of non-blighted, privately-owned residential properties
292

Unsurprisingly, Hayek had little to say about takings. See HAYEK, supra note 284.

293

Smythe, supra note 43, at 26–27.

294

Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).

295

Daniel B. Kelly, The “Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale
Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 39–40 (2006).
296 See Smythe, supra note 43, at 45 (explaining that the government’s coercive powers
could be used against the weak).
297

S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 736 (N.J. 1975).

298

Id.

299

This is not usually recognized as a word, but perhaps it should be. See infra note 337.

300

S. Burlington Cty., NAACP, 336 A.2d at 736.

301

Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005).

302

Id. at 483.

303

Id.
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and transferring them to private commercial and industrial investors. 304 Several of the
private homeowners challenged the city’s power to condemn their properties on the
grounds that the takings were not for a public use. 305 The case provides the Supreme
Court’s most recent statement on the scope of the public use requirement under the
Fifth Amendment.306
A majority of the Supreme Court held that the taking of property from some private
owners for its transfer to other private owners as part of an integrated development
plan is a public use under the Fifth Amendment, regardless of whether the properties
taken are blighted.307 The opinion extended the government’s power to take private
property for the sake of stimulating economic development. 308
In Berman v. Parker, the United States Supreme Court had already upheld the
government’s power to take property in a blighted neighborhood from some private
owners for its transfer to other private owners for economic development purposes,309
but Kelo extended that power to any properties, whether in a blighted neighborhood
or not.310 Although fostering economic development in blighted neighborhoods rather
than in non-blighted neighborhoods arguably may serve a greater purpose, the political
furor that Kelo caused was disproportionate to its constitutional significance.
Much of the political furor caused by Kelo seemed to derive from the government’s
use of eminent domain to stimulate economic development in non-blighted
neighborhoods and not from the government’s use of eminent domain to transfer
property from some individuals to others. 311 The controversy was probably greater
304

Id.

305

Id. at 475.

306

Id.

307

As Justice Stevens wrote for the majority:

Given the comprehensive character of the plan, the thorough deliberation that preceded
its adoption, and the limited scope of our review, it is appropriate for us, as it was
in Berman, to resolve the challenges of the individual owners, not on a piecemeal basis,
but rather in light of the entire plan. Because that plan unquestionably serves a public
purpose, the takings challenged here satisfy the public use requirement of the Fifth
Amendment.
Id. at 484.
308

As Justice O’Connor wrote in her dissenting opinion:

In moving away from our decisions sanctioning the condemnation of harmful property
use, the Court today significantly expands the meaning of public use. It holds that the
sovereign may take private property currently put to ordinary private use, and give it
over for new, ordinary private use, so long as the new use is predicted to generate some
secondary benefit for the public—such as increased tax revenue, more jobs, maybe even
esthetic pleasure.
Id. at 501 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
309

Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 29 (1945).

310

Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484.

311 This is understandable because the Supreme Court had already upheld the use of eminent
domain to transfer private property from some owners to other private owners to promote
economic development in blighted neighborhoods. Berman, 348 U.S. at 26.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2018

39

406

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:367

because many people believe blighted neighborhoods benefit from economic
development more than non-blighted ones, and the government should not undertake
economic redevelopment projects in non-blighted neighborhoods.312 In those respects,
and perhaps others, economic development in blighted neighborhoods may be closer
to a public good in the traditional sense than economic development in non-blighted
neighborhoods.313
But “economic development is not a public good,”314 and the concept of a public
good was obviously not within the contemplation of the drafters of the Bill of Rights
when they drafted the public use requirement for the exercise of the government’s
takings powers.315 Moreover, there is little reason to believe that economic
development in blighted neighborhoods provides more benefits to the residents in
those neighborhoods than economic development elsewhere in the city would or that
it provides more positive externalities.316
One could question why the government’s takings power should be used to
promote economic development at all and why the power has been extended to
facilitate transfers of land from some private owners to others. In a well-functioning
market economy, parties who wish to acquire land for commercial or industrial
purposes can and should do so through the market. 317 In fact, private parties purchase
land for large hotels, resorts, and manufacturing plants all the time. 318 Even though
they may need relatively large parcels, they are not typically impeded by hold-up
problems, possibly because they are able to make their purchases stealthily or because

312 See, e.g., Leonard A. Zax & Rebecca L. Malcolm, Economic Development, Eminent
Domain and the Property Rights Movement, Spring 2005, REAL EST. FIN. J. at 4; Ingrid Gould
Ellen et al., Building Homes, Reviving Neighborhoods: Spillovers from Subsidized Construction
of Owner-Occupied Housing in New York City, 12 J. HOUSING RES. 185, 186 (2001).
313 A pure public good is one that is both non-excludable and non-rival in consumption, in
the sense that it is impossible to exclude people from enjoying the benefits of its availability,
and there is no reason to exclude them from enjoying the benefits because their consumption
does not diminish the availability of the good for others. See David E. Van Zandt, The Lessons
of the Lighthouse: “Government” or “Private” Provision of Goods, 22 J. LEGAL STUD., 47, 50
(1993). The classic example is the lighthouse that provides a benefit to all ships that pass; one
ship’s use of it does not make the lighthouse any less available or helpful to other ships. Id.
314 Arthur J. Rolnick & Phil Davies, The Cost of Kelo, FED. RES. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS
(June 1, 2006), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/the-region/the-cost-of-kelo.
315

Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 473 (2005).

316

Miriam Zuk et al., Gentrification, Displacement and the Role of Public Investment: A
Literature Review 46 (Fed. Res. Bank of S.F., Working Paper No. 2015-05, 2015) (concluding
that most studies agree that gentrification in blighted neighborhoods displaces both homeowners
and renters and that economic redevelopment would provide scant benefits to people who the
redevelopment displaced).
317

See generally Steven J. Eagle, Private Property, Development and Freedom: On Taking
Our Own Advice, 59 SMU L. REV. 345 (2006); How to Purchase Commercial Real Estate, INC.
(July 8, 2010), https://www.inc.com/guides/2010/07/how-to-purchase-commercial-realestate.html.
318

See John R. Nolon & Jessica Bacher, Zoning and Land Use Planning, 37 REAL EST. L.J.
234, 240 (2008).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol66/iss2/7

40

2018]

THE POWER TO EXCLUDE

407

they are not tightly bound to make them in any specific locations.319 When the
government does not coordinate private investments by implementing large scale,
integrated development plans, private investors can make purchases of separatelyowned parcels through intermediaries without the separate owners even realizing that
some party is buying up a larger parcel of land.320 Moreover, if the investors do
encounter an individual owner who tries to exercise hold-up power, they are free to
sell off their newly purchased parcels and find a new location for their venture. While
the investors might not recoup their transaction costs and the next best alternative
location might not be quite as desirable, they are not as vulnerable to the hold-up
problem as a government redevelopment agency that is in the throes of redeveloping
a targeted neighborhood under an integrated development plan.
The greater problem with the Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence is that it
creates the potential for some individuals to use the government’s power of eminent
domain against other individuals for their own private gain. “Takings for public uses
that involve making the land open to the public or providing it to public carriers who
will make their services open to the public” might be justified on the grounds that they
help to mitigate the holdup problems that could impede the provision or drive up the
costs of goods and services to the general public.321 But government takings that
“reallocate properties from some private owners to others simply for the purpose of
encouraging economic development” are another matter.322 “[T]he use of State
coercion against some individuals for the benefit of others opens the door to an abuse
of the State’s powers by those who are the most wealthy and influential” and against
those who are the least wealthy and influential.323 Economic development takings thus
raise the possibility—perhaps even the likelihood—that “the State could serve as an
instrument for exactly the kind of coercion that it is supposed to prevent.” 324 If the
primary purpose of government in a just society is the protection and advancement of
319 A simple Google search of “anonymous real estate purchases” will yield myriad websites
offering advice about how to make stealthy land purchases and many offers to help—of course,
for a fee.
320 See The Secret Florida Land Deal that Became Walt Disney World, MIAMI HERALD
ARCHIVES
(May
16,
2017),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/state/florida/article150733437.html, for a recent story
about the acquisition of land for Walt Disney World in Orlando during the 1960s.
321

Smythe, supra note 43, at 28.

322 ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON AND THE LIMITS OF
EMINENT DOMAIN, 5, 16 (2015) [hereinafter SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND] (observing that the
Pfizer corporation not only strongly influenced the City of New London’s economic
redevelopment plan, but it also lobbied the city’s redevelopment agency extensively to
encourage it to exercise its takings powers); Smythe, supra note 43, at 28.
323 Smythe, supra note 43, at 28. In her dissenting opinion in Kelo, Justice O’Connor
warned:

[T]he fallout from this decision will not be random. The beneficiaries are likely to be
those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political process,
including large corporation and development firms. As for the victims, the government
now has license to transfer property from those with fewer resources to those with more.
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 505 (2005).
324

Smythe, supra note 43, at 28–29; see Cohen, supra note 282, at 495.
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its citizens’ liberty, “the power of eminent domain should be confined to cases where
it is essential to the provision of public good.”325
In fact, Berman should actually raise more concerns than Kelo. Because the
properties subject to the takings in Kelo were generally not blighted and the owners
therefore probably had more means, the exercise of State coercion was more likely to
meet resistance.326 But in Berman, the properties subject to the takings were generally
blighted, and it was less likely that any individual owner or group of owners would
mount serious resistance against the exercise of State coercion.327 As it turns out, the
challenge against the taking in Berman was made by a commercial property owner
whose property was not considered blighted. 328 Except for that owner, a challenge
might never have been made. As it turns out, the challenge failed, and the case set a
precedent for further exercises of State coercion of the same kind. 329 Moreover,
because there was no political backlash like the one in New London after Kelo, the
redevelopment plan proceeded and over five thousand mostly poor African-American
residents in the District of Columbia were displaced.330
If a government takes properties in a poor, blighted neighborhood to implement
some integrated economic redevelopment plan, the property owners will generally be
less able to challenge the takings, both legally and politically, than if the government
takes properties in a well-maintained, middle- or upper-middle class neighborhood.331
In the wake of Berman and Kelo, property development companies, sports franchises,
and corporations are now able to use the power of State coercion against poor and
politically marginalized individuals.332 In fact, they have already done so.333 Kelo was

325

Smythe, supra note 43, at 29. This would make the definition of a public good central to
the scope of the government’s takings powers, and, to some extent, simply change the focus of
the debate. But the traditional public uses much more clearly satisfy the public good requirement
than controversial redevelopment plans such as those in Kelo.
326

In fact, several plaintiffs filed suit in the Kelo case, and the political backlash their suit
caused probably increased the amount of compensation the city ultimately paid to them. SOMIN,
THE GRASPING HAND, supra note 322, at 233. In 2012, the Mayor of New London issued an
apology to the displaced property owners. Id. at 235. Ironically, ten years after the case, the
condemned properties remained undeveloped and unused. Id.
327

Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34 (1954).

328 Id. This is not surprising because the owners of the blighted properties probably lacked
the means or the incentives to challenge the takings.
329

See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.
v. Bos. & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407 (1992); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984);
Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008).
330

SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND, supra note 322, at 58.

331

Cohen, supra note 282, at 557.

332

See id. at 547; see also Erin A. Stanton, Home Team Advantage?: The Taking of Private
Property for Sports Stadiums, 9 N.Y.C. L. REV. 93, 94 (2005).
333 Takings in blighted neighborhoods since Berman have displaced hundreds of thousands
of people—mostly non-white—from their homes. SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND, supra note 322,
at 87–88; see U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS OF EMINENT
DOMAIN ABUSE 56 (2014) (documenting claims that redevelopment takings have often targeted
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rare because governments generally have not attempted to implement economic
development plans in non-blighted neighborhoods against middle- or upper-middle
class property owners. 334 This is probably not just because economic redevelopment
plans in middle- and upper-middle class or non-blighted neighborhoods would not
provide as much economic stimulus; it is probably also because the plans would meet
political and legal resistance from more influential citizens.335
Beginning with Berman, the Supreme Court’s takings cases since the middle of
the twentieth century have opened the door to the abuse of the government’s takings
powers for “expulsionary”336 purposes and not just exclusionary purposes. 337 In fact,
the presumption that urban redevelopment requires an “integrated development
plan”338 derives from the fact that the affluent residents that cities seek to attract want
to live in attractive, orderly neighborhoods with businesses and public services that
support an affluent upper-middle class lifestyle.339 These affluent residents’ decisions
to relocate into the cities from the suburbs340 are facilitated by large-scale
redevelopment plans that help to ensure that they have enough affluent neighbors and
upscale amenities such as grocery stores, retail shops, coffee shops, bakeries, and
neighborhoods with disproportionate numbers of racial minority and socio-economically
marginalized residents).
334 Chad J. Lersch, Northern’s Exposure: From Berman v. Parker to Kelo v. New London,
an Illustration of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Unwavering Private Application of the Public Use
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 18 DUPAGE CTY. B. ASS’N BRIEF 26, 30 (2005).
335 It was not coincidental that the City of New London’s redeveloped plan ended in failure
but the District of Columbia’s redevelopment plan did not. Ilya Somin, The Grasping Hand:
“Kelo v. City of New London” and the Limits of Eminent Domain, CATO INST. (June 23, 2015)
[hereinafter
Somin,
Limits
of
Eminent
Domain],
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/grasping-hand-kelo-v-city-new-london-limitseminent-domain (explaining those with economic resources can fight government takings).
336 This is probably not a word, but perhaps it should be. Professor David Dana uses the
term “exclusionary” to describe “the exercise of eminent domain that has the effect of excluding
low-income households from an otherwise predominantly or entirely middle-class or wealthy
neighborhood or locality, whether or not exclusion itself was the purpose of the condemnation.”
David A. Dana, Supreme Court Economic Review Symposium on Post-Kelo Reform:
Exclusionary Eminent Domain, 17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 7, 7–8 (2009). But when the
government uses eminent domain to take properties from some private owners and transfers the
properties to other private owners, the government exercises its powers to expel the initial
owners from the neighborhood and not simply to exclude them. See id. at 48.
337 Professor Dana proposes an exclusionary eminent domain doctrine that would fully
internalize the costs of economic development takings. Id. at 36–47. This Article, in contrast,
rejects the idea that the government should have the power to engage in such takings.
338 Iyla Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings After Kelo,
15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 183, 235–36 (2007) [hereinafter Somin, Controlling].
339
In the Kelo case, Pfizer, Inc. was not the intended transferee of any of the properties that
were subject to takings or any other properties that were intended to be redeveloped under New
London’s integrated development plan. Yet Pfizer knew that it would benefit from the
redevelopment project because its middle-class and upper-middle class employees would
benefit from the upscale housing, hotels, and restaurants that the neighborhood would attract.
SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND, supra note 322, at 16.
340

Id.
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restaurants to make inner-city living attractive to them.341 Once they have relocated to
their new urban homes, the affluent residents of tony high-rise condominium buildings
and refurbished townhomes are likely to make persnickety neighbors. 342 They are also
likely to pressure the police and elected city officials to move the homeless further
from their neighborhoods, provide better policing, and control what they consider
nuisance-some activities.343
D. An Incoherent Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court’s opinions in Berman and Kelo upheld an unreasonably
expansive interpretation of the scope of the public uses allowed under the Fifth
Amendment.344 Writing for the majority in Kelo, Justice Stevens claimed that the
Court had “repeatedly and consistently” interpreted “public use as ‘public
purpose.’”345 Thus, the Court’s task in Kelo was simply to decide whether the takings
intended in that case served a public purpose, which he claimed the cases had defined
broadly, “reflecting . . . [a] longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments
. . . .”346 Justice Stevens quoted from Berman, in which the Court equated “public use”
to a requirement that a taking advances the public welfare, noting that “[t]he concept
of the public welfare is broad and inclusive” extending to values that are “spiritual as
well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary.”347 Justice Stevens further wrote that
“[p]romoting economic development is a traditional and long-accepted function of
government” and that “[t]here is . . . no principled way of distinguishing economic
development from the other public purposes that we have recognized.”348
Most of what Justice Stevens wrote in Kelo and what Justice Douglas wrote in
Berman about the public use requirement was debatable to say the least. 349 The idea
that the government should stimulate economic development is a relatively recent
341

Id.

342

Spike Lee, for example, was reported to have alleged that his father, a jazz musician,
practiced on his drums in the family neighborhood in Brooklyn for many years and no one ever
complained until the neighborhood gentrified and some of the new residents began calling the
police. Ray Sanchez & Steve Almasy, Spike Lee Explains Expletive-Filled Gentrification Rant,
CNN
(Feb.
27,
2014),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/26/us/new-york-spike-leegentrification/index.html.
343 See, e.g., Lisa Halverstadt, Authorities Can’t Force the Homeless Off the Street. Here’s
OF
S.D.
(July
1,
2016),
What
They
Can
Do,
VOICE
http://www.voiceofsandiego.org/topics/nonprofits/authorities-cant-force-the-homeless-off-thestreet-heres-what-they-can-do/ (documenting the ways in which the San Diego police use
nuisance ordinances to manage and control San Diego’s homeless population).
344 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26
(1954).
345

Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480.

346

Id.

347

Berman, 348 U.S. at 33.

348

Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484.

349 In fact, Justice Stevens subsequently acknowledged that his opinion confounded
precedents from substantive due process with those from the public use requirement. SOMIN,
THE GRASPING HAND, supra note 322, at 8.
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one;350 it is therefore difficult to understand how the promotion of economic
development could possibly be characterized as a “traditional and long-accepted
function of government.”351 Beyond that, of course, it is disingenuous to suggest that
the promotion of economic development cannot be distinguished from other public
purposes. Moreover, it requires a leap of imagination to interpret the Court’s early
takings cases to have consistently interpreted the term “public use” as “public
purpose” since the confounding of public uses with public purposes is an artifact of
Berman.352 And while the Court in Berman certainly did extend the conception of the
public welfare to encompass spiritual and aesthetic values, the Court had not expressly
done so until then, which is one reason why Berman was such an important opinion.353
But Justice Stevens’s opinion mischaracterizes the Supreme Court’s takings
jurisprudence in an even more fundamental way. By equating the term public use with
public purpose, it appears to imply that the Takings Clause will allow any taking as
long as it is for a public purpose.354 Yet Justice Stevens’s opinion, like Justice
Douglas’s opinion in Berman, also draws a line between economic development
takings that are part of an integrated development plan and those that are not, thereby
suggesting that the former satisfy the public use requirement while the latter do not. 355
If economic development is a public purpose,356 and a public purpose is a public use,357
350 See, e.g., JOHN H. WOOD, A HISTORY OF MACROECONOMIC POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES
63 (2009).
351 Most economic historians attribute the origins of the idea that the government can
manage the economy to John Maynard Keynes, an early twentieth century economist whose
influence in the United States was not evident until the 1930s. See, e.g., id.
352 In her dissenting opinion in Kelo, Justice O’Connor observed that until Berman, takings
had only been allowed to “transfer private property to public ownership” and to “transfer private
property to private parties, often common carriers, who make the property available for the
public's use.” Kelo, 545 U.S. at 498.
353

Id. at 498–99.

354

Id. at 480.

355

Justice Stevens observed:

[A] one-to-one transfer of property, executed outside the confines of an integrated
development plan, is not presented in this case. While such an unusual exercise of
government power would certainly raise a suspicion that a private purpose was afoot,
the hypothetical cases . . . can be confronted if and when they arise.
Id. at 487.
356

Justice Stevens acknowledges so by observing:

[P]etitioners urge us to adopt a new bright-line rule that economic development does
not qualify as a public use. Putting aside the unpersuasive suggestion that the City’s
plan will provide only purely economic benefits, neither precedent nor logic supports
petitioners’ proposal. Promoting economic development is a traditional and longaccepted function of government.
Id. at 484.
357 Justice Stevens wrote, “when this Court began applying the Fifth Amendment to the
States at the close of the 19th century, it embraced the broader and more natural interpretation
of public use as ‘public purpose.’” Id. at 480.
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why is an economic development taking that is part of an integrated development plan
constitutional but an economic development taking that is not part of an integrated
development plan is unconstitutional? There obviously is more to the Supreme Court’s
takings jurisprudence than Justice Stevens’s opinion can coherently explain.
The equation of public uses with public purposes together with a distinction
between economic development takings that are constitutional and those that are not
implies that some economic development takings are for a public purpose and others
are not. If some economic development takings are for a public use but others are not,
then the concept of a public use must depend not only on the goals or objectives of the
government’s plan, but also on how broadly they provide benefits to the public. Thus,
not all economic development serves a public purpose; in fact, for economic
development to serve a public purpose, it must provide sufficiently broad benefits to
the public as a whole.358 The Court’s requirement that an economic development
taking be part of an integrated development plan is probably best understood as a way
of preventing economic development takings that are not likely to provide broad
public benefits.
If that is the rationale for the distinction, it is not very persuasive. On the one hand,
if the government implements an integrated development plan in which it takes
properties from some private parties and transfers them to other private parties, then
that is a constitutional taking because the public use requirement is met. 359 The
government will be obligated to pay just compensation, but it has the power to force
the transfers.360 Yet, on the other hand, if the government takes the same properties
from the same private owners sequentially one at a time and transfers them one at a
time to the same other private parties, then the takings would apparently not be
constitutional because they would not be part of an integrated development plan.361 In
the end, the two sets of takings could have essentially the same effect on economic
development, especially if the government undertakes the takings on the same
schedule (and there is no reason, in principle, why it could not). It is difficult,
therefore, to justify drawing the line between economic development takings that are
for a public use and those that are not based on whether the takings are part of an
integrated development plan.
The Supreme Court has defined the government’s takings power too broadly and
the power has been abused. Until the Court repairs the problem, it is likely that the
power will be abused again. Private developers, perhaps working in conjunction with
one another, may have enough at stake in the prospect of an integrated development
plan to use their influence and political power to pressure government officials to
develop and implement one, regardless of whether the prospective benefits will
redound to the general public or are particularly significant or broad. The power of
State coercion will thus be used against some private individuals on behalf of other
private individuals, without in any way forestalling or mitigating the exercise of
358 Patricia J. Askew, Take It or Leave It: Eminent Domain for Economic Development:
Statutes, Ordinances, & Politics, Oh My!, 12 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 523, 535 (2006).
359

See Kristi M. Burkard, No More Government Theft of Property! A Call to Return to a
Heightened Standard of Review After the United States Supreme Court Decision in Kelo v. City
of New London, 27 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 115, 119 (2005).
360

Id.

361

Somin, Controlling, supra note 338, at 235–36.
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coercive monopoly power. That will not only be anti-libertarian, as Justice O’Connor
warned; it will probably also allow the rich and powerful to exploit the poor and
weak.362
VI. CONCLUSION
Property laws have far-reaching implications and contribute to a plethora of
contemporary social problems, including income inequality, the intergenerational
transmission of poverty, de facto racial and ethnic segregation, and homelessness. 363
They also have important consequences for people’s satisfaction with their lives and
businesses’ profits. It is not surprising, therefore, that modern developments in
property law have been so strongly influenced by political pressures. As is generally
the case, those with the most economic resources and political power have had the
most telling influences on the way that property laws have developed in the United
States since at least the early twentieth century to the present.364
This Article has used a simple normal form game—the Not-In-My-Backyard
Game—to illustrate the motivations of various parties and the directions of the
political influences. As the game illustrates, on the one hand, affluent and wealthy
people who want to escape the grime and blight of urban neighborhoods to the suburbs
have incentives to pressure local governments for zoning regulations that effectively
exclude less affluent and less wealthy people from their neighborhoods. On the other
hand, affluent and wealthy people and larger businesses who want to relocate into
urban neighborhoods may be reluctant to do so unless city governments redevelop
entire neighborhoods to offer the amenities of an upscale, urban environment. This
puts pressure on city governments to use takings to facilitate urban redevelopment,
and the takings will often effectively expel many less affluent residents and smaller
businesses from their neighborhoods.
It was inevitable that local governments’ powers to enact comprehensive zoning
schemes with such extensive land use regulations would be challenged; it was also
inevitable that local governments’ takings powers would be challenged when they
began using takings to implement economic redevelopment plans that required the
transfer of property from some private owners to others.
In Village of Euclid v. Ambler, the Supreme Court upheld the power of local
governments to enact zoning laws without pausing to address aspects of the zoning
scheme that were blatantly exclusionary in purpose and effect.365 In Berman v. Parker,
and later in Kelo v. City of New London, the Court upheld the power of governments
to take property from private parties and transfer it to other private parties as long as
the taking was part of an integrated development plan, even though some of the
dissenting Justices raised concerns about how those with significant political influence
might use the government’s power to expel poor and marginalized people and smaller
businesses from their own neighborhoods. 366 Without in any way impugning the
integrity of the Court, it is difficult not to suspect that the majority opinions in those
362

Kelo, 545 U.S. at 505.

363

See supra note 9.

364

Cohen, supra note 282, at 495.

365

Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).

366

See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 490; Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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cases reflected the same values and aspirations as those of the affluent and politically
influential groups that typically benefit from Euclidean zoning and economic
development takings.
The difficult question is: what can be done about it? The central thesis of this
Article is that the abuse of government powers has caused these problems, and
therefore the obvious solution is to limit government powers. In an ideal scenario, the
United States Supreme Court would use the substantive due process doctrine to strike
exclusionary zoning regulations. This would include any categorical restrictions
against other types of residential housing in areas zoned for single-family residences.
It would also include any zoning restrictions that applied different setback, area, or lot
requirements for the same types of housing in different zones. Ideally, the United
States Supreme Court would also limit the scope of public uses for the purpose of the
Takings Clause to those that (1) transfer private property to a government, (2) transfer
private property to a private party that will use it for a facility or carrier that will be
open to the general public, such as a transportation carrier, or (3) in special
circumstances, mitigate the exercise of coercion by destroying monopoly power.
The United States Supreme Court is unlikely to take such actions anytime soon. In
the alternative, state supreme courts should take exactly the same actions as matters
of state constitutional law. States have not yet taken such action, but many state
legislatures have responded to the furor over Kelo by enacting statutes that limit local
governments’ takings powers.367 In fact, at least forty-five states have enacted statutes
of some kind in response to Kelo.368 Most of the statutes, however, do not ban
economic development takings in blighted areas, and they define blighted areas too
broadly.369 As the preceding discussion explains, takings to transfer property from
some private owners to others in blighted areas actually raise more concerns than such
takings in non-blighted areas because the subjects of the takings are less likely to have
the economic resources and political influence to protect themselves against the
takings.370 Thus, while the state legislative responses are welcome, they have been
inadequate.
Ultimately, the best hope for more fundamental change lies in the hearts and minds
of the next generation. The door to a more equitable, inclusive, and just society will
open if the rising generation of social and political leaders takes an open-minded look
at how property laws developed during the twentieth century, asks why that happened,
and questions whether the consequences have been socially constructive or
destructive. Once the door is open, a clearer social conscience will prevail. People will
see through the Not-In-My-Backyard Game for the veiled snobbishness and prejudice
that lies at its core. Legislatures will become more responsive to marginalized citizens,
and a new judicial attitude will begin to dominate the courts. City governments will
be less inclined to use their powers to exclude or expel people from residential
neighborhoods, and if they do, courts will begin to rein them in.
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